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The Constitutional Tort System 
NOAH SMITH-DRELICH* 
Constitutional torts—private lawsuits for constitutional wrongdoing—are the 
primary means by which violations of the U.S. Constitution are vindicated and 
deterred. Through damage awards, and occasionally injunctive relief, victims of 
constitutional violations discourage future misconduct while obtaining redress. 
However, the collection of laws that governs these actions is a complete muddle, 
lacking any sort of coherent structure or unifying theory. The result is too much and 
too little constitutional litigation, generating calls for reform from across the 
political spectrum along with reverberations that reach from Standing Rock to Flint 
to Ferguson.  
This Article constructs a framework of the constitutional tort system, drawing on 
contemporary tort scholarship’s rich theorization of a similar set of challenges that 
emerge in the private law context. By framing constitutional litigation as part of an 
essentially tort-like system, in which the law seeks to facilitate deterrence and 
compensation without unduly burdening state action, this Article presents an 
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INTRODUCTION 
Qualified immunity is under attack. A growing chorus of voices has questioned 
whether the doctrine, one of the cornerstones of constitutional tort law, may go too 
far in its drive to protect risk-averse public officials from personal liability. In the 
words of its critics, qualified immunity instantiates a regime of “heads government 
wins, tails plaintiff loses,”1 depriving plaintiffs whose rights have been violated of 
redress while undermining a crucial tool for “ensur[ing] accountability and 
professionalism in law enforcement.”2 This is especially a problem for members of 
 
 
 1. Cole v. Carson, 935 F.3d 444, 471 (5th Cir. 2019) (Willett, J., dissenting). 
 2. Qualified Immunity: The Supreme Court’s Unlawful Assault on Civil Rights and 
Police Accountability, CATO INST. (Mar. 1, 2018), https://www.cato.org/events/qualified-
immunity-supreme-courts-unlawful-assault-civil-rights-police-accountability [https:// 
perma.cc/U9P8-Y3ZT]; accord Emma Andersson, When Your Constitutional Rights Are 
Violated but You Lose Anyway, ACLU (July 11, 2018, 4:45 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog 
/criminal-law-reform/when-your-constitutional-rights-are-violated-you-lose-anyway 
[https://perma.cc/L5LM-N2U9]. 
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politically marginalized communities, who rely on the powerfully 
countermajoritarian force of private lawsuits when confronting official misconduct.3 
Yet in the face of these concerns, the Supreme Court has stood firm, doubling down 
on the strict applicability of qualified immunity: effective governance and policing 
cannot be sacrificed, not even in service of the rights and liberties enshrined in the 
U.S. Constitution.4 The result is an uneasy impasse, in which qualified immunity’s 
supporters argue that the doctrine’s application continues to fall short of adequately 
protecting government officials, while qualified immunity’s detractors condemn its 
severe limitation on the compensation and vindication of constitutional wrongdoing. 
Taking these respective concerns seriously, qualified immunity may facilitate too 
much and too little constitutional litigation. How can this be? 
The answer to this puzzle, this Article posits, may be found by looking beyond 
qualified immunity to the confused and constricted approach taken throughout the 
laws governing private lawsuits for constitutional violations more generally. 
Unmoored from any broader theoretical foundation, the laws of constitutional torts, 
as these suits are most commonly labeled, have developed in a haphazard and largely 
siloed fashion. The vigorous debate over the need for qualified immunity, for 
example, seemingly exists in a world without § 1988, an attorney fee-shifting 
provision that greatly influences the amount of constitutional tort litigation that is 
filed.5 The result is a “proliferation of inconsistent policies and arbitrary distinctions” 
that “renders constitutional tort law functionally unintelligible.”6  
This Article seeks to cut through this confusion by constructing a model of the 
constitutional tort system, providing an analytical framework through which doctrine 
can be shaped and evaluated. Rather than trying to assemble a theoretical model of 
constitutional torts from scratch, this framework bridges the gap between 
constitutional torts and their private law counterparts, building on contemporary tort 
theory’s rich discussion of similar challenges arising in the private law context. 
Indeed, the tension at the heart of much of constitutional tort doctrine—how to 
robustly deter and compensate without chilling societally desirable action—has been 
a central concern of tort scholarship for decades.7 Despite these similarities and their 
shared historical roots,8 the field of constitutional torts largely disregards the field of 
torts writ large, relying instead on a discordant collection of policy solutions 
borrowed from the nineteenth century or crafted from whole cloth.9 
 
 
 3. See James F. Blumstein, Federalism and Civil Rights: Complementary and 
Competing Paradigms, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1251, 1260 (1994). 
 4. See, e.g., City of Escondido v. Emmons, 139 S. Ct. 500, 504 (2019). 
 5. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2012); see infra Part II (examining, among other things, § 1988’s 
powerful normative and positive impact on qualified immunity).  
 6. John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Liability Rule for Constitutional Torts, 99 VA. L. REV. 207, 
208 (2013). 
 7. The instrumentalist view treats tort suits as tools for accomplishing goals like ensuring 
compensation and deterrence. See infra Part I.  
 8. See, e.g., William Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 45, 
54 (2018). 
 9. See, e.g., infra Part II. When courts do turn to the common law of torts, it is most 
commonly to answer a discrete question, such as defining the scope of the underlying 
constitutional right, see, e.g., Michael Wells, Constitutional Remedies, Section 1983 and the 
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Explicitly framing constitutional torts as comprising a tort-like system yields 
substantial payoffs. By clarifying the extent to which constitutional tort law is 
essentially concerned with optimizing the effects of constitutional litigation—
balancing constitutional rights and liberties against the state’s interest in protection 
and governance10—this framework highlights how crudely, and often inconsistently, 
the collection of reforms used within constitutional tort law work toward such an 
end.11 Qualified immunity, for example, seeks to limit the burden of the stress, 
stigma, and financial costs of litigation on desirable state action. But it offers a binary 
solution, immunity or no immunity, to a nonbinary problem: the stress, stigma, and 
financial cost of litigation weigh on decision-making with varying degrees of 
severity.12  
This Article’s conceptual shift, moreover, reveals an additional problem in this 
context, pervasive yet overlooked: bias. Unlike private law torts, constitutional torts 
owe their very existence to the recognition that state decision-making may be 
influenced by racial prejudice, religious animus, and other such invidious biases. 
Section 1983, for example, was enacted as part of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 in 
response to widespread anti-African American hostility throughout the ranks of 
government officials.13 Yet, in another move reflecting constitutional tort law’s 
neglect of tort theory, constitutional torts have borrowed their primary deterrence 
remedy—compensatory damage awards—from their private law counterparts with 
no consideration of or accounting for this difference. Although state actors who are 
biased will not be deterred from constitutional wrongdoing to the same extent as state 
actors who are not, compensatory damages are determined by the nature of the 
harm—a broken leg, a damaged camera, and so forth—rather than the reason for it. 
And when bias acts on decision making, compensatory damages will therefore fail 
to deter wrongdoing appropriately. 
Finally, this Article’s framework is useful not only for identifying problems but 
also for identifying solutions. Each of the doctrinal shortcomings and oversights 
examined in this discussion relates to some failure to balance deterrence and 
compensation against the need for effective policing and governance. The parallel 
nature of these problems, highlighted by this Article’s analytical framing of 
constitutional tort law, implies the possibility of a common solution. This Article 
offers one such reform, adapted from similar proposals in the context of private law 
torts: damage awards could be increased or decreased (via damage multipliers, caps, 
or proportional liability) to account for any influence, like the stress of being sued or 
the bias of state decisionmakers, that might skew the overall effect of the 
constitutional tort system. Such a reform could provide a more finely tunable 
 
 
Common Law, 68 MISS. L.J. 157 (1998) (collecting cases), rather than considering how the 
overlapping rules governing these cases do or should work in conjunction with one another.     
 10. See infra Part II; cf. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (gesturing to the 
importance of balance in this context without fully embracing optimal deterrence). 
 11. See, e.g., Jeffries, supra note 6, at 208. 
 12. See infra Part II (discussing qualified immunity, § 1988 attorney’s fees, and a number 
of other examples of such problems). 
 13. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Developments in the Law—Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV. 
L. REV. 1133, 1141–53 (1977); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
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mechanism for optimizing constitutional litigation, presenting an answer not only to 
the policy problems associated with qualified immunity—increasingly recognized 
across the political spectrum—but also to the challenges that arise from § 1988 
attorney’s fees, indemnification, and a wide variety of additional doctrines and 
practices in this context.  
The stakes could not be much higher. Private suits for constitutional wrongdoing 
have grown into a significant force, with tens of thousands of such cases filed each 
year.14 Indeed, § 1983 inmate cases alone comprise over ten percent of all federally 
filed cases.15 And as a result, constitutional tort law’s failures reach throughout 
society; the problems identified by this Article’s framework impact not only policing 
but also prisons, public schools, public health, public housing, and public planning.16 
The consequences of these failures, moreover, are not evenly distributed. Politically 
vulnerable populations and members of disfavored groups disproportionately bear 
the brunt of constitutional tort law’s disfunction.17  
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I examines the applicability of 
instrumentalism to constitutional torts, concluding that it is not only appropriate but 
that it also represents the dominant mode of analysis currently used in this context. 
Part II then builds and applies a tort-like instrumentalist framework for constitutional 
torts, illustrating the importance of carefully balancing the competing interests 
implicated by constitutional tort suits and the inadequacy of current doctrine. Part III 
explores how this framework shines new light on bias’s influence on the 
constitutional tort system, and bias’s threat to balance in this context. Finally, Part 
IV introduces a novel solution to these problems: tailored damage awards present a 
promising mechanism for facilitating a closer-to-optimal operation of constitutional 
torts. 
I. INSTRUMENTALISM AND CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS 
In Monroe v. Pape, the Supreme Court rejuvenated § 1983, giving rise to the 
modern constitutional tort suit.18 Since then, constitutional tort law has evolved in 
fits and starts into its modern form: a patchwork of discrete rules bearing little in 
common with one another.19 Although courts routinely gesture to the “common law 
of torts” in this context, constitutional tort law does not resemble its private law 
 
 
 14. Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics 2019, U.S. CTS. (Mar. 31, 2019), https://www 
.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/federal-judicial-caseload-statistics-2019 [https://perma.cc 
/3RJK-8B5Y]. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Constitutional wrongdoing in the context of policing alone is no small issue; a 2011 
Justice Department report estimated that forty million people had contact with the police in 
2008 and that 776,000 people “experienced force or the threat of force by police at least once.” 
CHRISTINE EITH & MATTHEW R. DUROSE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., CONTACTS BETWEEN POLICE 
AND THE PUBLIC, 2008, at 11 (2011). 
 17. See, e.g., Blumstein, supra note 3, at 1260. 
 18. 365 U.S. 167 (1961). 
 19. “Even though we know that rights and remedies are connected, interactive, and 
mutually dependent and defining, constitutional tort law pretends that it is not so.” John C. 
Jeffries, Jr., Disaggregating Constitutional Torts, 110 YALE L.J. 259, 262 (2000).  
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counterpart. This is, to some extent, a result of its 1871 enabling statute and the 
special legal requirements that attend suing the government; indeed, William Baude 
and an ascendant minority of constitutional tort formalists argue that constitutional 
tort doctrine should be even more historically constrained than it currently is.20 But 
in large part, the differences between constitutional and private law torts result not 
from any such limitations but from the Court’s rule-by-rule approach to challenges 
in this context: the doctrine of qualified immunity has evolved without much regard 
for the application of § 1988 attorney’s fees, which has developed without much 
regard for the near-universal practice of indemnification, and so forth.21 
The disjointed nature of constitutional tort law has left open an important 
threshold question: what kind of examination is appropriate for the challenges arising 
in this context? Contemporary tort scholarship is full of competing theories that 
explore the normative and positive roles of tort law, any of which could lend a great 
deal of structure and coherence to the law of constitutional torts.22 Broadly speaking, 
these theories fall into two distinct categories—instrumental and noninstrumental. 
Instrumentalism holds that torts serve as a powerful instrument of public policy: tort 
law is and should be shaped to facilitate societal goals like efficient deterrence, loss 
spreading, and compensation.23 On the other hand, noninstrumental tort theories treat 
tort law as purely deontological in nature, that is, as being justified by principle rather 
than presumptively favorable consequences.24 
There is a tendency in the constitutional tort context to label constitutional rights 
and liberties as noninstrumental, “as deontological side-constraints that trump even 
utility-maximizing government actions.”25 But there is little indication that such a 
perspective has entered significantly into the actual consideration or construction of 
constitutional torts. To the contrary, a closer examination reveals that constitutional 
tort law is comprised largely of critiques that loosely reflect—without referencing—
the dominant instrumentalist approach to private law torts. Scholars examining 
constitutional torts have typically focused on the resulting consequences of these 
suits, criticizing doctrines and practices that fail to appropriately facilitate deterrence 
or compensation.26 Joanna Schwartz, for example, writes in a recent article about 
how each jurisdiction’s ecosystem of plaintiff’s lawyers, defense counsel, judges, 
juries, and legal rules and remedies shapes how many cases are brought.27 This is an 
 
 
 20. See, e.g., Baude, supra note 8.  
 21. See infra Section II.B, C. 
 22. Cf. J. Maria Glover, The Structural Role of Private Enforcement Mechanisms in 
Public Law, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1137 (2012) (building a conceptual framework cognizant 
of both public and private conceptions of tort law).  
 23. See, e.g., John Gardner, What is Tort Law for?, 30 L. & PHIL. 1, 1–2 (2011).  
 24. Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, Not Corrective Justice, 91 GEO. L.J. 695, 699 
(2003). 
 25. Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of 
Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 367 (2000). 
 26. See, e.g., id.; Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Bidding Farewell to Constitutional Torts, 107 
CALIF. L. REV. 933 (2019); Jeffries, supra note 19; Daniel J. Meltzer, Deterring Constitutional 
Violations by Law Enforcement Officials: Plaintiffs and Defendants as Private Attorneys 
General, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 247, 286 (1988).  
 27. Joanna C. Schwartz, Civil Rights Ecosystems, 118 MICH. L. REV. 1539 (2020).  
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instrumentalist (and quintessentially tort-like) mode of analysis—albeit one that has 
been applied, so far, with little regard for what tort theorists have said about these 
challenges.28  
Likewise, the law of constitutional torts as enacted by Congress and the courts is 
full of tort-like approaches to tort-like problems that don’t actually reference torts.29 
Section 1988, for example, enacts a fee-shifting provision designed to incentivize 
plaintiffs’ lawyers to litigate these cases vigorously.30 There is a lively branch of 
instrumentalist tort scholarship—again, ignored in discussions of § 1988—
concerned with how the incentivization of plaintiff’ lawyers influences the broader 
effects of tort law.31 
 It may well be that constitutional torts are best considered through a 
noninstrumental tort lens.32 Such an approach, though, would require a fundamental 
reimagining of the interests at stake in this context, as well as the rejection of decades 
of Supreme Court jurisprudence.33 On the other hand, because constitutional tort law 
today operates in large part along an instrumentalist valence,34 a framework rooted 
in instrumentalism allows for an examination that builds substantially on prior work 
 
 
 28. See, e.g., Kenneth S. Abraham, Prosser’s The Fall of the Citadel, 100 MINN. L. REV. 
1823, 1844 (2016); Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 
70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961) (pioneering this approach in the context of private law torts); William 
M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Positive Economic Theory of Tort Law, 15 GA. L. REV. 
851 (1981).  
 29. Despite the Court’s longstanding disfavor for the creation of federal common law, 
constitutional torts continue to be largely guided by policy-rooted and judge-made (and 
shaped) doctrines. See, e.g., Hillel Y. Levin & Michael L. Wells, Qualified Immunity and 
Statutory Interpretation: A Response to William Baude, 9 CALIF. L. REV. ONLINE 40, 45 (2018) 
(arguing that this is appropriate because § 1983 is a common law statute). Bivens is more 
clearly a form of federal common law, although it has become, potentially as a consequence, 
heavily constrained in recent years. See, e.g., 403 U.S. 388 (1970); William N. 
Evans, Supervisory Liability After Iqbal: Decoupling Bivens from Section 1983, 77 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1401, 1405 (2010). This Article accepts as a basic premise—consistent with the Court’s 
current jurisprudence—that there remains some role for judicial policymaking in the context 
of constitutional torts. 
 30. 42 U.S.C. § 1988; see, e.g., Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 (1983).  
 31. In expanding on this discussion, Part II further illustrates the inherent instrumentalism 
of current constitutional tort scholarship and law. 
 32. For an example of what that looks like, see, e.g., Bernard P. Dauenhauer & Michael 
L. Wells, Corrective Justice and Constitutional Torts, 35 GA. L. REV. 903, 911 (2001) 
(providing a corrective justice account of constitutional torts); cf. Barbara E. 
Armacost, Qualified Immunity: Ignorance Excused, 51 VAND. L. REV. 583 (1998) 
(analogizing constitutional torts to criminal law in an effort to describe qualified immunity 
using the noninstrumental language of fairness and fault). 
 33. Take qualified immunity, for example. When viewed noninstrumentally, the question 
of whether constitutional tort suits chill desirable state action is irrelevant. Cf. Michael L. 
Wells, The Past and the Future of Constitutional Torts: From Statutory Interpretation to 
Common Law Rules, 19 CONN. L. REV. 53 (1986); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS 
SERIOUSLY 184–205 (1977). 
 34. See, e.g., infra Section II.C (discussing and highlighting the essential instrumentalism 
of § 1988 and qualified immunity).  
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in this context, yielding the possibility of sweeping reform that may nevertheless be 
adopted under the current legal regime.  
II. CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS AS TORTS 
Part II seeks to reverse constitutional tort law’s tendency toward ad hoc 
policymaking by examining these suits through the instrumentalist lens favored in 
the context of private law torts. Although the policy aims of constitutional torts may 
not perfectly resemble those in the private law context, Part II applies this tort-like 
analysis to the particular rules, practices, and policies of constitutional torts. By 
treating constitutional torts as a private party-driven mechanism for vindicating 
important public interests—that is, as a kind of a contemporary tort—this discussion 
reveals both the significance of optimal deterrence in this context and the inadequacy 
of current doctrine in promoting either optimal deterrence or coherent distributional 
effects. Part II concludes by resituating prior critiques of constitutional torts within 
this proposed framework, revealing the essential shared core at the heart of these 
seemingly disparate analyses. 
A. The Subjects of Constitutional Tort Deterrence  
As is the case with private law torts, deterrence is a central consideration when it 
comes to making and evaluating constitutional tort law. But who, exactly, is deterred 
by constitutional tort suits? This is an important first-order question for 
understanding the constitutional tort system: a regulatory system that acts directly on 
potential wrongdoers will operate differently from a system that acts through 
policymakers who indirectly influence the commission of torts via hiring, firing, 
training, and other such decisions.  
In the private law tort context, the deterrence that flows from tort suits is 
predominantly conceived in terms of its corporation- and industry-wide effects—that 
is, in terms of its impacts on policymakers.35 When it comes to constitutional torts, 
however, the Supreme Court has long assumed, without much examination, that the 
threat of litigation primarily influences individual potential tortfeasors directly.36 
Indeed, this assumption has played a central role in the creation and development of 
the doctrine of qualified immunity, which seeks “to shield [individual] officials from 
harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.”37 
 As recent research has shown, however, the reality of deterrence in this context is 
likely more complicated:38 the deterrent effect of constitutional litigation is split, with 
any stress or stigmal burdens of litigation falling predominantly on individual 
tortfeasors while the financial costs of litigation, including the damage awards 
themselves, are borne almost exclusively by departments and municipalities.  
 
 
 35. See, e.g., David G. Owen, Rethinking the Policies of Strict Products Liability, 33 
VAND. L. REV. 681, 711 (1980). 
 36. See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). 
 37. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009); cf. John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: 
The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1349 (1995) (discussing 
similar agency-cost problems in the mass torts context).  
 38. See Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885, 890 (2014). 
2021] THE CONSTITUTIONAL TORT SYSTEM  579 
 
This is unintuitive. At first glance, the Supreme Court’s assumption about the 
effects of constitutional litigation appears to be correct: because municipal liability’s 
stringent “policy or custom” standard serves as a de facto bar to so many 
constitutional tort claims brought against municipalities—plaintiffs must show an 
official policy or a pattern of departmental misconduct so widespread as to “have the 
force of law”39—the overwhelming majority of § 1983 suits for damages are brought 
against state actors in their personal capacity. Constitutional litigation is therefore 
predominantly concentrated on individual potential tortfeasors: officers working the 
beat and so forth.  
However, looking only at who is sued when evaluating the deterrent effect of 
constitutional litigation leads to deceiving results. Although individual tortfeasors 
comprise the bulk of defendants in § 1983 suits, the financial costs of constitutional 
litigation are borne almost exclusively by the state—municipal governments and the 
like. This is because indemnification, the practice of the municipality or department 
paying any settlements or damage awards (and usually also litigation costs) on behalf 
of its employees, is nearly universal in the context of constitutional wrongdoing; 
individual constitutional tortfeasors effectively never have to pay for their own 
misdeeds. In fact, one recent national study revealed that law enforcement officers 
financially contributed to only 0.41% of all settlements and judgments against them, 
paying less than 0.02% of the total damages.40 Indemnification shifts the deterrent 
effect of damage awards from individual officers to department-level 
policymakers.41 And, as a result, it is predominantly policymakers who consider the 
financial impacts of constitutional litigation. Like their private counterparts, 
government bureaucrats are therefore positioned to evaluate the costs and benefits of 
policies giving rise to potential liability before enacting those policies.42  
 
 
 39. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y.C., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978); Bd. of Cnty. 
Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 411 (1997) (setting out a searching “deliberate 
indifference” mens rea requirement); Karen M. Blum, Section 1983 Litigation: The Maze, the 
Mud, and the Madness, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 913, 916 (2015) (describing the difficulty 
of municipal liability litigation). 
 40. Schwartz, supra note 38, at 890. Counterintuitively, this study also indicated that 
officers never contributed towards punitive damages. Id. It is less clear how widespread 
indemnification is outside of the policing context. See generally James E. Pfander, Alexander 
A. Reinert & Joanna C. Schwartz, The Myth of Personal Liability: Who Pays When Bivens 
Claims Succeed, 72 STAN. L. REV. 561 (2020) (reporting similar results in the context of Bivens 
suits in the Federal Bureau of Prisons). 
 41. The increasing role of third-party insurers in governmental policymaking, see infra 
text accompanying note 110, serves as a backstop that further ensures institutional-level 
deterrence effects of constitutional tort suits. 
 42. To what extent governmental policymakers do evaluate the costs and benefits of such 
policies, however, is a more difficult question. See Section II.D for more discussion. 
Moreover, the question of how exactly constitutional liability impacts department-, municipal-
, and state-level policy is not perfectly straightforward, and is discussed in greater detail in 
Section II.A. For more on individual decision-making within governmental organizations, see 
Barbara E. Armacost, Organizational Culture and Police Misconduct, 72 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 453, 475, 509–10 (2004); PETER H. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT: CITIZEN REMEDIES 
FOR OFFICIAL WRONGS 125–46 (1983).  
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This split system ensures that significant deterrence flows from these suits to both 
the individual actors personally sued (via the stress and stigma of litigation) and 
departmental policymakers (via the financial burdens of litigation). Constitutional 
torts may well dissuade officials from taking societally desirable risks; but if so, they 
do so in a subtly different manner than what is currently assumed. 
There are a number of implications that flow from this. For one, the doctrine of 
qualified immunity may present a more robust shield for the conduct of individual 
state actors than what the Supreme Court has intended.43 This is because the doctrine 
has been shaped around the assumption that the threat of damage awards significantly 
motivates individual potential tortfeasors.44 If damage awards exert less of a 
deterrence influence on such individual behaviors than what is commonly 
understood, because their financial burdens are primarily borne by departments, that 
means that qualified immunity is more protective than it was intended to be. 
Likewise, because qualified immunity is applied with no regard for whether an 
officer will be indemnified, in the event that there are material differences in the 
practice of indemnification—as there likely are outside of the context of policing—
the deterrent effects of constitutional tort suits will be unexpectedly uneven.45  
Moreover, these split deterrence effects imply that larger damage awards will not 
necessarily lead to greater individual-level deterrence: as the value of the claim in 
question increases, the stress and stigma of that claim may remain constant or 
increase at a lower rate. This suggests that it may be possible to design tonics for 
stress or stigma that do not similarly diminish damage awards. If true, qualified 
immunity, which tempers both the stress and stigma of litigation and damage awards, 
is more protective of state action than is strictly necessary.46  
Finally, indemnification constitutes a de facto form of vicarious liability, a private 
tort doctrine that shifts the financial costs of wrongdoing from individual employee 
tortfeasors to their employers.47 Although Monell concluded that the 1871 Congress 
did not intend to impose vicarious liability through § 1983,48 the widespread 
voluntary adoption of this practice through indemnification signals that there may be 
an appetite for statutory change in this regard. Formalizing the applicability of 
vicarious liability in this context would, in turn, likely result in a shift in litigation 
toward the deep pockets of municipalities, thereby easing the undesirable individual-
level deterrent effects of constitutional tort suits.49 Treating constitutional torts more 
 
 
 43. See infra Section II.C.2 (discussing qualified immunity in greater detail).  
 44. See infra Section II.C.2; see also Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 240 (1974) 
(describing, as a primary justification of qualified immunity, “the danger that the threat of 
[personal] liability would deter [an officer’s] willingness to execute his office with the 
decisiveness and the judgment required by the public good”). 
 45. See infra Section II.C.2. 
 46. If nothing else, this examination therefore shows how badly more research is needed 
into the deterrence effects of constitutional tort suits. 
 47. See, e.g., Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280, 285 (2003). 
 48. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y.C., 436 U.S. 658, 691–92 (1978). 
 49. Some states already voluntarily do this. See Lisa D. Hawke, Municipal Liability and 
Respondeat Superior: An Empirical Study and Analysis, 38 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 831, 848 
(2005) (reporting study showing that “about half of the cities accept respondeat superior 
liability under state law for misconduct by individual police officers”). Liability could likewise 
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like private law torts in this respect would therefore mitigate one of the more 
significant problems engendered by constitutional litigation—its chill on individual 
action—potentially obviating the need for qualified immunity altogether.50  
B. Optimal Deterrence 
This discussion brushes up against a second important question in this context: 
how much deterrence do (or should) constitutional torts seek?  
At the very least, it is probably safe to conclude that constitutional torts do not 
strive for absolute deterrence—although, certainly, no amount of constitutional 
wrongdoing is desirable.51 This is because the deterrent effect of constitutional 
litigation presents a double-edged sword. The threat of damages discourages 
unconstitutional misconduct, yes. But it also may dissuade officials from 
constitutional actions, as the burdens of litigation and liability lead state actors to shy 
away from taking societally beneficial and constitutionally permissible risks. A 
system tailored to ensuring that the Constitution was never violated would thus most 
likely also undesirably depress state action.52  
Instead, constitutional tort law appears to strive for “optimal deterrence,” albeit 
with little express recognition of this aim.53 Too much constitutional litigation chills 
societally beneficial state action; too little results in the violation of constitutional 
rights and liberties.54 Indeed, as is the case with private law torts, whether conceived 
as a system for maximizing compensation, deterrence, or some more abstract goal 
like corrective justice, there will always be an inherent tension between the benefits 
and detriments of constitutional torts—and some point of equipoise at which the 
value of more constitutional litigation is outweighed by its costs.  
Constitutional tort law’s unspoken embrace of optimal deterrence (and 
instrumentalism more generally) is reflected, in part, in the Court’s acceptance that 
compensatory damages “ordinarily suffice to deter constitutional violations.”55 This 
 
 
be shifted to states via limited waivers of sovereign immunity, which would allow suits against 
states in a greater range of circumstances or for larger amounts.  
 50. See infra Section II.C.2 (discussing qualified immunity in greater detail); Fallon, 
supra note 26, at 940 (arguing on behalf of such a scheme). Such a change would be broadly 
consistent with developments in tort theory: “No longer is individual ‘blameworthiness’ the 
acid test of liability; the principle of equitable loss-spreading has joined fault as a factor in 
distributing the costs of official misconduct.” Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 
657 (1980). 
 51.  Cf. Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. 
ECON. 169, 180 (1968) (discussing and modeling a similar question in the criminal context, 
reaching the same conclusion). 
 52. “Action has significant personal costs without corresponding personal benefits; 
inaction may have few benefits—personal or social—but little cost as well.” Cass Sunstein, 
Judicial Relief and Public Tort Law, 92 YALE L.J. 749, 751 (1983) (concluding, therefore, that 
“[t]he possibility of personal liability for unlawful action tends to generate inaction, delay, or 
an unproductive formalism that produces little but documents to defend officials in lawsuits”). 
 53. For a rare recognition of optimality in this context, see Levinson, supra note 25.  
 54. Cf. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (gesturing to the importance of 
balance in this context without fully embracing optimal deterrence). 
 55. Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 310 (1986). It is also reflected 
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may be contrasted with the approach taken in the criminal defense context, where the 
Court has relied on far more severe deterrent remedies like the exclusionary rule.56 
Unlike exclusion, which will often result in complete exoneration, compensatory 
damage awards impose the costs of wrongdoing on the tortfeasor, and only those 
costs, thereby ensuring that any associated harms of unconstitutional actions are 
internalized by the tortfeasor.57 This, in turn, encourages policymakers to act “when 
it is economically efficient, from a societal point of view, to do so”—i.e., when the 
benefits of an activity outweigh its harms.58 But it also means that if there are 
categories of constitutional wrongdoing for which no amount of rights violation is 
acceptable, as some scholars have suggested,59 the current compensatory-damages-
based deterrence regime will fall short. Except in those rare circumstances in which 
injunctive relief can be obtained, to violate the Constitution, the state must merely be 
willing to pay for any resulting harm.60  
If this sounds familiar, it is because it is a reflection of “efficient deterrence 
theory,” the dominant instrumentalist view of private law tort deterrence.61 Efficient 
deterrence theory holds that that damage awards—generally determined by the extent 
of harm—will compel policymakers “to internalize the total cost of [the] harmful 
activity.”62 Constitutional torts’ reliance on compensatory damages for deterrence is 
at least a rudimentary imitation of efficient deterrence in the private law tort context. 
 
 
in the Court’s application of § 1988 and qualified immunity: both of these rules seek to permit 
or even encourage some—but not too much—constitutional litigation. See infra Section II.C 
(discussing this in more detail). 
 56. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 980 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting); 
Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 463 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting); cf. Levinson, supra 
note 25, at 367 (noting that “constitutional rights are most commonly conceived as 
deontological side-constraints that trump even utility-maximizing government action”). But 
see Fallon, supra note 26 at 964 (describing the “common phenomenon of interest balancing” 
in substantive constitutional law); Jamal Greene, A Private Law Court in a Public Law System, 
12 LAW & ETHICS HUM. RTS. 37, 53–58 (2018) (arguing for explicitly adopting such an 
approach). 
 57. In practice, this calculus will be muddied by the risk of non-recovery as well as the 
transaction costs of obtaining compensation, including the stress, stigma, and financial 
burdens of litigation. Sections II.C and D will discuss these complicating factors in more 
detail. 
 58. Marc Galanter & David Luban, Poetic Justice: Punitive Damages and Legal 
Pluralism, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1393, 1447 (1993); see also Armacost, supra note 42, at 475 
(“To the extent that chiefs of police view a little bit of brutality as an effective law enforcement 
tool, they will balance the costs of liability against the perceived gains of aggressive 
policing.”).  
 59. See, e.g., Levinson, supra note 25, at 368 (arguing that the “optimal level of violations 
of [certain] rights may be close to zero”). 
 60. Cf., e.g., Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 
70 YALE L.J. 499, 535–38 (1961). The alternative would be to significantly harshen remedies: 
if the penalty for violating the Constitution was $1 billion or more, violations would approach 
zero.  
 61. See, e.g., Galanter et al., supra note 58, at 1447; Robert Cooter, Economic Analysis of 
Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 79, 82-85 (1982); Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on 
Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499, 535–38 (1961). 
 62. Galanter et al., supra note 58, at 1447; see also Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman 
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For an illustration of this, imagine a police department considering whether its 
officers should be retrained to avoid using chokeholds.63 Assuming, for purposes of 
this hypothetical, that chokeholds are an effective means of restraint without a good 
alternative, allowing officers to use chokeholds will lead to more arrests than will a 
no-chokeholds policy—and, consequently, to better public safety. On the other hand, 
chokeholds occupy a constitutional gray area and are prone to abuse.64 If the police 
department allows its officers to apprehend suspects using chokeholds, it is likely 
that additional constitutional harms will result—for which the department will have 
to pay via § 1983 damage awards.65 Under the current remedial scheme, if the 
chokehold policy is likely to result in $100,000 in costs (consisting primarily of the 
risk-adjusted costs of constitutional litigation) but only $80,000 in benefits 
(consisting of the utility gains of improved public safety and the money saved from 
not having to retrain officers), the police department will be incentivized to abandon 
its use of chokeholds. On the other hand, if the chokehold policy is likely to result in 
$100,000 in costs but $120,000 in benefits, the police department will be encouraged 
to continue to use chokeholds—despite the fact that doing so will result in some 
constitutional harms.66 Real-world decision-making is not, of course, as easily 
simplified or quantified as this example implies. For purposes of this discussion, 
though, it is only important to accept that a rational instrumentalist choice to 
implement a policy comes down, on a very general level, to some version of 
weighing the costs and benefits of that policy. 
Recognizing the importance of optimal deterrence in this context does not require 
subscribing to a view of constitutional tort law limited to strictly pecuniary benefits 
and costs.67 Nor does it require the calculation of a single universal optimal level of 
deterrence that applies to all potential rights violations. The nature of the 
governmental interests implicated by the Fourth Amendment differ from those 
implicated by the First Amendment, and the rights protected by the Fourth 
Amendment differ from the rights protected by the First Amendment. As such, the 
optimal balance between the government’s interests and the underlying rights may 
 
 
Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 439 (2001); Levinson, supra note 25, at 347 (recognizing “the 
similarities between the goals (deterrence) and mechanisms (cost-internalization) of private 
law damages and constitutional cost remedies”). Whether or not damage awards do 
accomplish this in the constitutional context will be discussed in more detail in Section II.C. 
 63. The chokeholds policy was first used as an illustration of efficient deterrence theory 
by Daryl Levinson. See Levinson, supra note 25, at 371. 
 64. Cf. City of L.A. v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 108 (1983) (recognizing the possibility that 
L.A.’s chokehold policy would result in “injury and death unconstitutionally inflicted”). 
 65. The constitutional violations are, therefore, “a by-product of socially productive 
government activity.” Levinson, supra note 25, at 370. 
 66. This example is intended for illustration and not to imply that these sorts of values 
may be identified with this level of precision.  
 67. See infra Section II.C, discussing the inherent value of constitutional rights. Indeed, 
as the Court has recognized, efficient deterrence may not even represent the preferable 
paradigm throughout private law torts: “Citizens and legislators may rightly insist that they 
are willing to tolerate some loss in economic efficiency in order to deter what they consider 
morally offensive conduct, albeit cost-beneficial morally offensive conduct; efficiency is just 
one consideration among many.” Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 
424, 439–40 (2001) (quoting Galanter et al., supra note 58, at 1450). 
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depend on which interests and which rights are affected; optimal deterrence in the 
context of the Fourth Amendment may not be optimal in the context of the First 
Amendment.68  
Indeed, although there has been little discussion of how this balance should be 
conducted, the Court has implicitly recognized the existence of right-by-right and 
interest-by-interest differences in its jurisprudence on injunctive relief. Injunctive 
relief is not a perfectly parallel remedy to damage awards—among other things, the 
usefulness of injunctive relief is limited by the difficulty of predicting future 
wrongdoing, the availability of a civil rights bar ready to quickly file, and courts’ 
willingness to grant this extraordinary remedy69—but the legal test for issuing an 
injunction implicitly reflects a similar acceptance of optimal deterrence: to halt a 
constitutional violation through injunctive relief, a plaintiff must not only prove 
likely constitutional wrongdoing, but that “the balance of equities tips in his favor, 
and that an injunction is in the public interest.”70 Courts considering injunctive relief 
have repeatedly declined to balance formulaically the rights and interests in question, 
applying instead a context-specific evaluation that assigns different weights to 
different interests.71  
C. Nonoptimal Deterrence 
Although the current doctrine is full of discussions of the importance of 
maximizing deterrence or minimizing the disruption of effective governance and 
policing, constitutional tort law’s rule-by-rule approach has facilitated little 
 
 
 68. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, 
and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1789–90 (1991) (“For example, our 
constitutional tradition recognizes a stronger interest in relief from continuing coercion—for 
instance, in reversing an unconstitutional conviction—than in obtaining remedies for the 
government’s violation of the contract clause.”); Levinson, supra note 25 at 368 (“Some types 
of constitutional violations resemble intentional torts or crimes in that they can be avoided 
with minimal effort or precaution-taking by government. The optimal level of violations of 
these rights may be close to zero.”). 
 69. As the civil rights and civil liberties response to aggressive policing of the Standing 
Rock NoDAPL movement illustrates, these sorts of access issues can present a real problem 
for litigators: although a wide range of potential constitutional abuses were well-publicized by 
early September 2016, the first and only attempt to seek any sort of injunctive relief was filed 
in late November—and it was denied. Dundon v. Kirchmeier, No. 1:16-CV-406, 2017 WL 
5894552, at *1 (D.N.D. Feb. 7, 2017), aff’d, 701 F. App’x 538 (8th Cir. 2017); see also, e.g., 
Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1858 (2017) (“[I]f equitable remedies prove insufficient, a 
damages remedy might be necessary to redress past harm and deter future violations.”); We 
Are the ACLU of North Dakota, ACLU N.D., https://www.aclund.org/en/about/staff 
[https://perma.cc/PK3J-6VSP] (listing a single ACLU staff attorney responsible for managing 
any litigation throughout all of North Dakota, South Dakota, and Wyoming). 
 70. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). 
 71. See, e.g., Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573, 584 (2006) (recognizing the “State’s 
strong interest in enforcing its criminal judgments without undue interference from the federal 
courts” (emphasis added)); Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 554 (1993) (recognizing 
that the Court has “interpreted the First Amendment as providing greater protection from prior 
restraints than from subsequent punishments”). 
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consideration of balance or optimization. The result has been a collection of 
constitutional tort remedies that work ineffectively, or in tension with each other, 
toward this end.   
1. Section 1988 and Nonoptimal Deterrence 
Section 1988, for example, is a fee-shifting statute that generally results in the 
state paying plaintiffs’ attorney’s fees in successful constitutional litigation.72 This 
ensures that even low-value cases and cases seeking purely injunctive relief are 
litigated; the importance of vindicating constitutional rights is such that Congress felt 
justified in breaking from the longstanding U.S. tradition of each party paying its 
own fees in litigation.73 
But this is not the extent of § 1988’s import. Section 1988’s provision of 
attorney’s fees for all constitutional tort suits points to a view of the constitutional 
torts system that is concerned more generally with enhancing the protection of 
constitutional rights and liberties: attorney’s fees plus compensatory damages will 
provide greater deterrence than compensatory damages alone.74 Such an approach 
would be consistent, broadly speaking, with that taken in the criminal defense 
context; as Justice Stevens powerfully wrote in his dissent in United States v. Leon, 
“[I]t is the very purpose of a Bill of Rights to identify values that may not be 
sacrificed to expediency.”75 It does not, however, necessarily imply a rejection of 
optimal deterrence; § 1988 attorney’s fees simply shift the systemic deterrent effect 
of constitutional torts toward more (and potentially above-efficient) deterrence. 
The Court has also read another purpose into § 1988’s enhancement effect: to 
offset constraints on compensatory damage awards in this context. In Carey v. 
Piphus, the Court held that compensatory damages could not be awarded based on 
the presumed inherent value of the constitutional provision at issue; awards must be 
limited to only those injuries that accompany a constitutional violation.76 This means 
 
 
 72. 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Because, however, the statute speaks in the general terms of the 
“prevailing party,” courts may also (though rarely do) shift fees to § 1983 plaintiffs as well—
albeit “only where it is shown that [the] suit was clearly frivolous, vexatious, or brought for 
harassment purposes.” S. REP. 94-1011, at 5 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908, 
5912.  
 73. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988; S. REP. No. 94-1011, at 6 (discussing the purpose of attorney’s 
fees in, among other things, ensuring that even low-value cases and cases seeking injunctive 
relief are litigated); Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 240 (1975) 
(holding that only Congress can authorize an exception to the “American Rule”). 
 74. See, e.g., David Rosenberg, Mandatory-Litigation Class Action: The Only Option for 
Mass Tort Cases, 115 HARV. L. REV. 831, 853–54 (2002) (discussing and defining the 
compensation-centered private law tort understanding of optimal deterrence). 
 75. 468 U.S. 897, 980 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Anything less fails to recognize 
the “transcendent importance of the Bill of Rights,” Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 463 
(1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting), instead relegating the Constitution to little more than a utility-
maximizing tort statute. Meltzer, supra note 26, at 286 (discussing differences between civil 
and criminal remedies for the deterrence of constitutional wrongdoing).  
 76. 435 U.S. 247, 253 (1978) (basing holding, in part, on an attempt to apply the “common 
law” of tort compensation to constitutional violations); John C. Jeffries, Jr., Damages for 
Constitutional Violations: The Relation of Risk to Injury in Constitutional Torts, 75 VA. L. 
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that an employee fired without due process may not be able to recover more than 
nominal damages if her employer can later show good cause for her firing—despite 
the individual and societal value of whatever process has been lost. Such a rule skews 
the systemic effect of constitutional torts, disfavoring the underlying constitutional 
interests at stake, especially in the context of violations of due process. But because 
of § 1988, the Court was not dissuaded: “[T]he potential liability of § 
1983 defendants for attorney’s fees provides additional—and by no means 
inconsequential—assurance that agents of the State will not deliberately ignore due 
process rights.”77  
The problem with these respective justifications for § 1988 is that attorney’s fees 
add to the value of lawsuits with little regard to the underlying purposes implicated 
by these suits: it is cases that are more complicated or more resolutely defended that 
will yield the richest attorney’s fees, not cases involving the greatest threats to the 
most sacred of constitutional values.78 Section 1988 may facilitate above-efficient 
deterrence and compensation, but it does so in a haphazard manner, disconnected 
from whatever it is that justifies additional deterrence. Likewise, although attorney’s 
fees can offset the Court’s narrow view of compensatory damages in this context, 
they rarely will, instead providing too much or too little compensation based on 
factors exogenous to the right or liberty at issue. Under either justification for 
attorney fee shifting, constitutional torts demand better deterrence rather than simply 
more deterrence. Section 1988 provides the latter but not necessarily the former.79 
 
 
REV. 1461, 1475 (1989) (proposing that constitutional damage awards should be limited to 
“constitutionally relevant risks.” For example, “Compensation for violations of the fourth 
amendment [sic] should redress the invasion of privacy, not the costs of criminal 
prosecution.”). 
 77. Carey, 435 U.S. at 257 n.11 (citation omitted); see also Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. 
Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 307 (1986) (“Deterrence is also an important purpose of this system, 
but it operates through the mechanism of damages that are compensatory—damages grounded 
in determinations of plaintiffs’ actual losses.” (emphasis in original)). This is not the only 
justification for the Court’s ruling: the Court also expressed concern over how such awards 
would be determined. Id. Also, as Daryl Levinson has noted, “one interesting hypothesis is 
that the Court was reluctant to allow monetary recovery for the intrinsic value of constitutional 
rights because of the need to maintain incommensurability between rights and money. If the 
value of constitutional rights and cash could be compared on a single metric, then it would be 
more difficult to think of constitutional rights as qualitatively different from other social 
interests and values. Yet the legitimacy of constitutionalism depends on maintaining the 
incommensurability of constitutional rights so they can work as trumps.” Daryl J. 
Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 857, 934 n.327 
(1999). 
 78. The actual financial calculus associated with bringing suits in this context is more 
complicated, although not in a way that renders § 1988 more coherent. For plaintiffs’ lawyers, 
who typically foot the bill for these suits, the likelihood of litigation success and the costs of 
litigation (the latter of which often consists largely of expert fees) are also important 
considerations in the determination of what cases are brought. The result is that § 1988 
primarily incentivizes the litigation of cases with a high likelihood of success (or settlement) 
that require little by way of expert testimony. 
 79. As Maggie Lemos has indicated, fee shifting provisions like § 1988 may actually be 
ineffective or even counterproductive in facilitating constitutional litigation. Margaret H. 
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2. Qualified Immunity and Nonoptimal Deterrence 
Even while it has approved of § 1988’s role in incentivizing constitutional tort 
suits, the Supreme Court has also expressed concern about the drawbacks of too 
much litigation in this context, albeit with little acknowledgment of § 1988’s 
potential role in any such crisis.80  
This concern springs from the recognition that the overwhelming majority of the 
conduct deterred by constitutional tort suits—policing, public policy programs, and 
so forth—also produces societal benefits, often substantial. As a consequence, the 
Supreme Court has been quick to identify litigation externalities that may lead to too 
much deterrence: the “fear of being sued,” for example, may “dampen the ardor of 
all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible public officials, in the unflinching 
discharge of their duties.”81 Similarly, individual potential wrongdoers in the 
“government [may] not fully internalize the [dispersed] social benefits of [their] 
activity.”82 And when constitutional torts deter good state action along with the bad, 
the resulting consequences can be serious, undermining the government’s role in 
safeguarding and furthering the public interest.83  
This concern regarding systemic overdeterrence (although rarely framed by the 
Court in such instrumentalist terms) has fueled the creation of an entire court-created 
legal doctrine: qualified immunity.84 Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, state 
 
 
Lemos, Special Incentives to Sue, 95 MINN. L. REV. 782 (2011). 
 80. See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) (disregarding § 1988); Malley v. 
Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986) (same); Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001) (same); Pearson v. 
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) (same). Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), predates § 1988, 
which was enacted in 1976, Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 
94-559, 90 Stat. 2641. 
 81. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814 (internal modifications omitted) (quoting Gregoire v. Biddle, 
177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d. Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950)). Put in other words, 
lawsuit risk-aversion might lead public officials to be overly sensitive to the costs imposed by 
constitutional litigation. 
 82. Levinson, supra note 25, at 354 (emphasis added) (describing another concern 
repeatedly raised by the Supreme Court). 
 83. “[T]he public interest requires decisions and actions to enforce laws for the protection 
of the public.” Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 241 (1974), abrogated on other grounds 
by Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982); cf. Coffee, supra note 37, at 1349. 
 84. John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 YALE L.J. 87, 
90 (1999) (“The threat of overdeterrence—more accurately, the threat of unintended 
deterrence of socially desirable activity—justifies limiting damage recoveries in order to 
protect the legitimate but nonconstitutional interests at stake in the business of government.”). 
This oft-cited policy justification for qualified immunity may not formally ground the rule. 
See, e.g., Baude, supra note 8, at 78–79 (recognizing this reasoning but indicating that “the 
Court has [so far] used more traditional legal arguments as the opening wedge for these policy 
concerns”). On the other hand, several recent decisions of the Supreme Court have implied 
otherwise. See, e.g., Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1866 (2017) (“The qualified immunity 
rule seeks a proper balance between . . . competing interests.”); City & Cty. of S.F. v. Sheehan, 
135 S. Ct. 1765, 1774 n.3 (2015) (“Because of the importance of qualified immunity ‘to 
society as a whole,’ the Court often corrects lower courts when they wrongly subject individual 
officers to liability.” (citation omitted) (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814)); White v. Pauly, 
137 S. Ct. 548, 551 (2017) (reiterating qualified immunity’s special status due to its 
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officials acting in their official capacity are only liable when they violate “clearly 
established” constitutional law.85 This effectively gives defendants in constitutional 
litigation the benefit of the doubt. When a constitutional violation could have been 
based off of a reasonable mistake of law—even if it, in fact, wasn’t—qualified 
immunity requires dismissal.86 At least in theory, this frees state action from the 
choking collar of liability.87 
The doctrine of qualified immunity may, however, go beyond simply providing a 
resolution for such externality-related failures in optimal deterrence. In direct tension 
with (and with no regard for) § 1988, qualified immunity depresses the deterrence 
that would otherwise flow from compensatory damage awards:88 the objective 
reasonableness standard ensures, in the balance between the competing interests at 
stake, that it is the state that benefits from its mistakes. By placing the entire burden 
of uncertainty on the victims of constitutional wrongdoing, qualified immunity shifts 
the systemic deterrent effect of constitutional litigation toward less overall 
deterrence.89  
Moreover, as is the case with § 1988, qualified immunity employs a standard that 
is poorly tailored to the underlying issues at stake. Of the many factors identified by 
the Court that might increase the deterrent value of constitutional litigation to above-
optimal levels, qualified immunity’s standard addresses only one: protecting state 
 
 
importance “to society as a whole” (quoting id.)); Alan K. Chen, Rosy Pictures and Renegade 
Officials: The Slow Death of Monroe v. Pape, 78 UMKC L. REV. 889, 910 (2010) (“Like 
absolute immunity, qualified immunity is entirely policy-driven.”); Fallon, supra note 26, at 
946 n.46 (tracing “the origins of official immunity” to Spalding v. Vilas, which based its 
finding of official immunity on “general considerations of public policy and convenience” 
(quoting Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 498 (1896)); id. at 994 (noting that in Allen v. 
McCurry and University of Tennessee v. Elliott, “the Court held that suits under § 1983 were 
foreclosed under preclusion principles that had not yet emerged at the time of § 1983’s 
enactment”). 
 85. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818 (1982). 
 86. See id. at 818–19. 
 87. Recent research by Joanna Schwartz implies, however, that the doctrine may not 
work: few cases are actually dismissed on qualified immunity grounds. See Joanna C. 
Schwartz, How Qualified Immunity Fails, 127 YALE L.J. 2 (2017). It may be, however, that 
the doctrine of qualified immunity winnows out cases prefiling, which would not be reflected 
in Schwartz’s study. 
 88. At the very least, sub-efficient deterrence is one result of the doctrine of qualified 
immunity. See, e.g., Devon W. Carbado, Blue-on-Black Violence: A Provisional Model of 
Some of the Causes, 104 GEO. L.J. 1479, 1523 (2016); 2 SHELDON H. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS 
& CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION: THE LAW OF SECTION 1983 § 8:5 (4th ed. 2016) (expressing 
concern about the Fourteenth Amendment specifically); see also Jeffries, supra note 84, at 
99–100 (“Qualified immunity reduces government’s incentives to avoid constitutional 
violations.”); cf. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1870-71 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(expressing reservations about qualified immunity, albeit for non-policy reasons); Zadeh v. 
Robinson, No. 1750518, slip op., Aug. 31, 2018, http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub 
/17/17-50518%20-CV0.pdf [https://perma.cc/5CAE-JL6T] (Willett, J., concurring) (same). 
 89. As Myriam Gilles observes in In Defense of Making Governments Pay, qualified 
immunity essentially shifts the scienter requirement for constitutional torts from negligence to 
recklessness or intentionality. Myriam E. Gilles, In Defense of Making Government Pay: The 
Deterrent Effect of Constitutional Tort Remedies, 35 GA. L. REV. 845, 856–57 (2001).  
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officials from the consequences of their reasonable mistakes.90 The extent to which 
stress or stigma are likely to accompany a suit, on the other hand, does not factor into 
the question of whether qualified immunity applies.91 Although qualified immunity’s 
applicability at early stages of litigation helps guard against the stress and stigma of 
litigation, there will be cases with enormous stress and stigma burdens to which 
qualified immunity does not apply; and there will be cases that give rise to virtually 
no stress or stigma that are quickly dismissed under qualified immunity. 
The means by which qualified immunity acts is similarly ill-suited to the 
doctrine’s underlying purposes. Qualified immunity seeks to mitigate the associated 
effects of litigation—stress, stigma, litigation costs, and so forth—that can chill 
desirable policing and governance.92 Although each of these factors weighs on state 
action in a matter of degree, qualified immunity offers a resolution that is strictly 
binary: immunity or no immunity. This disjunction between the nature of the 
problem and the nature of the resolution means that even if individual applications 
of qualified immunity appear defensible, the systemic effect of the doctrine will be 
nonoptimal.93 And because these problems with qualified immunity’s standard and 
resolution are likely to manifest unevenly throughout constitutional tort law,94 
qualified immunity may give rise to too much and too little constitutional litigation. 
 Finally, qualified immunity’s development with little regard for the broader 
constitutional tort system has resulted in numerous additional potential issues related 
to the interactions among qualified immunity and other doctrines and practices. For 
one, qualified immunity’s inattention to the split deterrent effects in this context may 
yield widespread (and unnecessary) under-compensation: numerous victims of 
constitutional wrongdoing are deprived of redress even where recovery would not 
 
 
 90. See, e.g., Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). 
 91. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985) (recognizing stress and stigma 
as key deterrence concerns implicated by constitutional litigation).  
 92. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985). 
 93. This may be illustrated with the following example: Imagine a constitutional suit for 
$100,000 in compensatory damages that gives rise to $25,000 in accompanying transaction 
costs and nonpecuniary harms. Left alone, the deterrence value of this suit ($125,000) is 
greater than necessary to internalize the societal harms in question ($100,000). Under the 
doctrine of qualified immunity, there are two possibilities: (1) the suit would go forward, 
providing, if successful, $125,000 in deterrence value, which is $25,000 too much; or (2) the 
suit would be dismissed, providing $0 in deterrence, which is $100,000 too little.  
At least in theory, the aggregated effects of qualified immunity could still result in optimal 
deterrence: if 20% of such suits were dismissed under qualified immunity, the risk-adjusted 
cost of litigation would be $100,000 (80% x $125,000 + 20% x $0). Because, however, the 
percentage of suits dismissed under qualified immunity is not influenced by the nonpecuniary 
costs at stake in a type of suit—stress, stigma, and so forth—there is little reason to believe 
that qualified immunity will facilitate anything close to optimal levels of constitutional 
litigation. 
 94. See, e.g., Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015) (describing the heightened 
importance of qualified immunity in the “Fourth Amendment context”); Gilles, supra note 89, 
at 857 (observing qualified immunity’s particular applicability in the context of negligence 
torts, where officers’ heat of the moment decisions implicate fact- and context-dependent 
inquiries with few well-developed standards). 
590 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 96:571 
 
likely result in the chilling of desirable state action.95 Moreover, a constitutional tort 
lawsuit might ultimately yield anywhere from nothing to several multiples of what 
compensatory damages alone would provide (once attorney’s fees are included), with 
the difference turning on a single judge’s determination of whether a constitutional 
violation was clearly established—and not of whether the Constitution was violated 
or whether the constitutional violation was particularly objectionable. This greatly 
magnifies horizontal inequity and unpredictability, as the judge who is assigned or 
the jurisdiction in which a case is brought become even more important to the 
resolution of the case. Indeed, the harshness of qualified immunity may be prompting 
some judges to be reluctant in its application, which would further amplify such 
effects.   
 As this discussion shows, qualified immunity has been shaped without proper 
consideration for either its purposes or its effects. Irrespective of whether these 
failures merit fully replacing the doctrine,96 this Article provides a template for how 
policy-driven changes to qualified immunity (and § 1988 and other rules in this 
context) should be considered by courts. 
D. Resituating Prior Critiques 
This Article is not the first to question or criticize the operation of constitutional 
tort law. (Qualified immunity arises out of one such line of criticism.) Part II 
therefore concludes by examining, through this Article’s instrumentalist lens, a 
number of other critiques of constitutional torts. This, in turn, reveals a common 
thread running throughout—to which Part III adds: “damages that compensate for 
actual harm” do not “ordinarily suffice to deter constitutional violations.”97  
Importantly, although this discussion illustrates the numerous ways in which the 
constitutional tort system may be skewed or imbalanced, it does not strike at the 
deeper normative question of balance.98 Ensuring neither too much nor too little 
constitutional litigation must be, even in the face of these critiques, a primary policy 
consideration of constitutional tort law.  
 
 
 95. Indeed, under qualified immunity, it is possible that an officer who violates her 
department’s guidelines may be immunized from liability, irrespective of whether the 
guidelines in question were correctly and carefully crafted to protect a constitutional right. 
Such a rule encourages neither careful policing nor responsible policy design. 
 96. See infra Part IV.D. 
 97. Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 310 (1986). The Supreme 
Court’s continued acceptance of this rule is especially perplexing given that most § 1983 
“damages” take the form of settlements. Richard Emery & Ilann Margalit Maazel, Why Civil 
Rights Lawsuits Do Not Deter Police Misconduct: The Conundrum of Indemnification and a 
Proposed Solution, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 587, 589 (2000). And although settlement values 
typically closely track the perceived value of the case in question, they rarely constitute the 
full amount demanded.  
 98. See supra Section II.B. 
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1. Political, Not Economic, Costs 
First, in Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of 
Constitutional Costs, Daryl Levinson argues that “government actors respond to 
political, not market, incentives.”99 As a result, “[t]he only way to predict the effects 
of constitution cost remedies is to convert the financial costs they impose into 
political costs.”100 This insight does not necessarily imply that constitutional torts 
result in systemic overdeterrence or underdeterrence, but rather that the behavioral 
effects of constitutional litigation may be different than what is widely assumed: 
political cost translation effects can render compensatory damage awards 
inadequate—or too strong. 
Levinson’s argument may be illustrated by returning to the chokehold 
hypothetical. Imagine, for example, that the police department in question answers 
to a voting population that is somewhat inattentive to tax increases but is very 
cognizant of public safety. $100,000 in chokehold-related § 1983 damages, passed 
through to the population via higher taxes, may therefore generate only $50,000 in 
political costs. On the other hand, the $80,000 in public safety benefits created from 
using chokeholds may give rise to $80,000 in political capital. In such circumstances, 
a policy that the police department should abandon under efficient deterrence theory 
(because its costs—$100,000—exceed its benefits—$80,000) may be left in place 
(because its political costs—$50,000—do not exceed its political benefits—
$80,000). 
This is, however, only a problem insofar as political costs diverge from economic 
costs. As Myriam Gilles writes, “constitutional damage remedies, although 
denominated in dollars, clearly translate into the political currency that moves 
political actors.”101 On the other hand, Marc Miller and Ronald Wright have argued 
that tort liability may, paradoxically, financially benefit police departments, as “city 
council members, county boards, and city and county administrators . . . reward 
police with larger budgets, since the political returns for higher police funding and 
appearing tough on crime may be worth the budgetary cost.”102 Further research is 
needed to determine to what extent and when economic and political costs diverge.  
This is not, however, the only way in which Levinson’s insight complicates the 
view of constitutional deterrence. Individuals and communities harmed by 
 
 
 99. Levinson, supra note 25, at 347. 
 100. Id. (noting that “any such model will be highly contextual, complex, and 
controversial”); cf. SCHUCK, supra note 42, at 125. But cf. Louis Kaplow, An Economic 
Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 509, 567–70 (1986); Edward Rubin, 
Commentary, Rational States?, 83 VA. L. REV. 1433, 1439–42 (1997). 
 101. Gilles, supra note 89, at 861. It may rarely be the case that $100,000 in economic 
costs does not generate roughly $100,000 in political costs.  
 102. Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, Secret Police and the Mysterious Case of the 
Missing Tort Claims, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 757, 782 (2004). More recent research, however, has 
shown that such risks may be overstated: “[S]ettlements and judgments in suits against law 
enforcement agencies and officers are not always—or even usually—paid from jurisdictions’ 
general funds.” Joanna C. Schwartz, How Governments Pay: Lawsuits, Budgets, and Police 
Reform, 63 UCLA L. REV. 1144, 1148 (2016) (reporting results of empirical study on this 
question). 
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unconstitutional misconduct will express their distaste for these harms through 
voting decisions—thereby directly imposing the political costs of wrongdoing on the 
relevant policymakers.103 The tyranny of the majority means, however, that these 
first-level political consequences will often—but not always—prove insufficient to 
ensure adequate deterrence.104 And whereas the politically powerful may seek 
recourse through their influence, politically vulnerable individuals and 
communities—whose voices and votes may carry little weight with policymakers—
must depend more fully on constitutional litigation to ensure adequate deterrence.  
Similarly, where the benefits of state action accrue to a community that lacks 
political power, those benefits may be undervalued by state policymakers: the 
political capital generated by aiding a politically powerless community will often be 
less than the political capital generated by aiding a politically influential 
community.105 This effect could cut toward overdeterrence and therefore suboptimal 
employment of state action that disproportionately benefits those individuals and 
communities with less electoral influence.  
2. Governmental Failure to Internalize Costs 
Second, several scholars have described governance-related problems that may 
limit the deterrent effect of constitutional litigation. Underlying each of these 
critiques is a broader skepticism about constitutional deterrence—that is, that 
constitutional actors are unlikely to undertake (or are incapable of undertaking) the 
sort of careful cost-benefit analyses on which optimal deterrence relies.  
In Myths and Mechanics of Deterrence: The Role of Lawsuits in Law Enforcement 
Decisionmaking, Joanna Schwartz shows that many police departments do not 
adequately collect or track data on damage awards and, therefore, they lack the 
information necessary to internalize properly the costs of their constitutional 
wrongdoing.106 The informational failures observed by Schwartz likely cut toward 
underdeterrence: constitutional decisionmakers cannot be deterred by damage 
awards of which they are unaware.107  
Another concern, closely related, is that the deterrent effect of damage awards 
may be weakened when damages awarded against one governmental branch or office 
are paid by another.108 For example, suits involving law enforcement are often paid 
 
 
 103. These effects are not additive, and so they do not give rise to a threat of 
overdeterrence: when compensatory damages are sufficient to make injured parties and 
communities whole, there should be no negative spillover political consequences of 
constitutional wrongdoing. 
 104. See Levinson, supra note 25, at 364 (discussing a range of political internalization 
problems related to the tyranny of the majority). 
 105. See id. 
 106. See, e.g., Joanna C. Schwartz, Myths and Mechanics of Deterrence: The Role of 
Lawsuits in Law Enforcement Decisionmaking, 57 UCLA L. Rev. 1023 (2010); see also PAUL 
CHEVIGNY, THE EDGE OF THE KNIFE 102 (1995) (reporting that neither the L.A. nor the N.Y.C. 
police department appeared to respond to constitutional liability with material policy changes).  
 107. It is also possible that ignorance could lead to overdeterrence; for example, 
policymakers may have an exaggerated idea of the liability risks their department faces.  
 108. Michael T. Morley, Public Law at the Cathedral: Enjoining the 
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from the general funds of governments rather than by the law enforcement agencies 
directly. Although some such costs of constitutional wrongdoing may trickle down 
from the general funds to the agencies in question, any disconnect between who pays 
and who commits the tort is likely to result in underdeterrence: departmental 
policymakers have less incentive to make changes in response to costs borne by 
departments other than their own. Recent research, however, has blunted the force of 
this concern. In a nationwide study, Joanna Schwartz revealed that settlements and 
judgments are not, in fact, usually paid from the general funds of jurisdictions—and, 
additionally, that more than half of law enforcement agencies financially contributed 
to judgments and settlements for which they were responsible.109  
Moreover, these concerns are both mitigated by the reliance of states on private 
insurance to pay settlements: even if state policymakers are unaware of the direct 
costs of constitutional wrongdoing (because of their information-collection failures, 
because of general fund structural issues, or because of a broad-based agnosticism 
toward optimal deterrence), their insurance companies pay close attention, passing 
along the costs of riskier practices to the governmental departments in the form of 
higher premiums.110 In fact, as John Rappaport notes in An Insurance-Based 
Typology of Police Misconduct, best practices resulting from cost-internalization in 
the constitutional context are increasingly being driven by these insurers, which 
demand departmental policy shifts to minimize perceived liability.111 It may, 
therefore, be unnecessary for state policymakers to understand the direct 
constitutional costs of their policies; so long as the costs of insurance policies 
accurately reflect the constitutional liability incurred by the state, policymakers will 
indirectly internalize those costs in their decision-making.112 There are likely 
 
 
Government, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 2453, 2468 (2014) (“[M]any agencies are not required to 
pay large damage awards out of their own budgets; rather, such judgments typically are paid 
from the general fund of the municipality, state, or federal government.”); NAT’L RSCH. 
COUNCIL, FAIRNESS AND EFFECTIVENESS IN POLICING: THE EVIDENCE 279 (Wesley Skogan & 
Kathleen Frydl eds., 2004) (explaining how “damages in these suits are . . . not even paid out 
from the police budget but out of general city funds”); SAMUEL WALKER, THE NEW WORLD OF 
POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY 33 (Claudia A. Hoffman, Edward Meidenbauer & Jerry Westby, 
eds., 2005) (“[O]ne agency of government (the police) perpetrates the harm, another agency 
defends it in court (the law department), and a third agency writes the check (the treasurer).”). 
But see Schwartz, supra note 102, at 1298. One closely related concern is that “government 
officials will not always be able to influence the conduct of low-level government actors that 
interact with the public and are most likely to be named as defendants.” Id. at 1152; cf. 
SCHUCK, supra note 42, at 125–26. 
 109. Schwartz, supra note 102.  
 110. Id. at 1163–64; John Rappaport, An Insurance-Based Typology of Police Misconduct, 
2016 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 369 (2016) (noting that “nearly all” law enforcement agencies rely on 
private insurers for constitutional liability payments). 
 111. Rappaport, supra note 110, at 1163–64. 
 112. See id.; Schwartz, supra note 102, at 1149 (“Accordingly, pressures and obligations 
imposed by outside insurers are an important and underappreciated consequence of liability 
for smaller law enforcement agencies.”). The nation’s largest cities are predominantly self-
insured, but such departments also tend to be more sophisticated (and less indifferent) toward 
the liability costs of policing. Id. 
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inefficiencies in such a system.113 Filtering the costs of constitutional liability 
through an insurer may not always result in accurate cost assessment by departmental 
policymakers.114 But there is no reason to believe that such inaccuracies are 
systemically biased toward either underdeterrence or overdeterrence.  
3. Uneven Enforcement 
Third, successful constitutional litigation may be too sporadic or haphazard to 
sufficiently deter constitutional wrongdoing.115 As is the case in the context of private 
law torts, many of those who are harmed choose not to sue for reasons unrelated to 
the merits of their claims—such as, for example, for fear of retaliation.116 Moreover, 
many potential plaintiffs who would otherwise sue are barred by the various 
immunity doctrines that apply to constitutional litigation—including not only 
qualified immunity, but absolute immunity for officials performing judicial, 
prosecutorial, or legislative functions.117 On top of these immunities, the Court’s 
jurisprudence in this context is rife with other obstacles for plaintiffs—from 
potentially heightened pleading standards under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8,118 
to the procedural due process doctrine,119 to the increasing unavailability of 
attorney’s fees for § 1983 litigation.120 Thus, numerous plaintiffs harmed by 
 
 
 113. See Kenneth S. Abraham, Cost Internalization, Insurance, and Toxic Tort 
Compensation Funds, 2 VA. J. NAT. RES. L. 123, 125 (1982) (discussing issues, including moral 
hazard, with insurance in the context of toxic torts). 
 114. See, e.g., Rappaport, supra note 110 (discussing a number of ways in which insurance-
based civil rights regulation fails); Andrea Cann Chandrasekher, Empirically Validating the 
Police Liability Insurance Claim, 130 HARV. L. REV. F. 233, 235 (2017) (arguing for the 
necessity of empirically testing Professor Rappaport’s claims).  
 115. Chen, supra note 84, at 910; Meltzer, supra note 26, at 284; Joanna C. Schwartz, What 
Police Learn from Lawsuits, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 841, 863–64 (2012) (discussing a Bureau 
of Justice statistics report suggesting that people who believe they have been mistreated by the 
police only sue approximately one percent of the time). 
 116. See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. 
REV. 349, 430 (1974); Caleb Foote, Tort Remedies for Police Violations of Individual Rights, 
39 MINN. L. REV. 493, 500 (1955); cf. id. at 508 (discussing the issues that incarcerated 
individuals face in bringing civil suits); see also Meltzer, supra note 26, at 284. 
 117. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) (judicial immunity); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 
U.S. 409 (1976) (prosecutorial immunity); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 372–76 (1951) 
(legislative immunity); see also Alan K. Chen, The Facts About Qualified Immunity, 55 
EMORY L.J. 229, 232 (2006) (arguing that qualified immunity is approaching absolute 
immunity). For a discussion of uneven enforcement in the private law context, much of which 
also applies here, see Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, 
113 YALE L.J. 347, 366 (2003). 
 118. Chen, supra note 84, at 912 (arguing that Iqbal’s requirement that the plaintiff “plead 
factual matter that, if taken as true, states a claim that . . . [the official defendants] deprived 
him of his clearly established constitutional rights” establishes a higher level of specificity for 
constitutional claims (alteration in original) (emphasis in original) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
556 U.S. 662, 666 (2009)). 
 119. Id. at 913 (pointing out several ways in which the Court’s due process decisions 
disadvantage § 1983 litigation). 
 120. Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 115 (1992) (refusing to award attorney’s fees for a 
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constitutional violations will never sue, and numerous plaintiffs harmed by 
constitutional violations who do sue will never recover. The result is systemic 
underdeterrence: these practical and legal obstacles to recovery depress the risk-
adjusted costs of litigation. If only a small fraction of victims of constitutional 
wrongdoing ultimately recover, compensatory damages alone will fall significantly 
short of what is necessary to deter wrongdoing adequately. 
4. Switching Costs 
A fourth concern is that indirect costs in this context, such as the cost of averting 
wrongdoing (retraining and so forth) and of the litigation itself, may influence the 
deterrent effect of constitutional litigation. Policies that might be optimal in a cost-
less world could nevertheless be discouraged by such switching costs. For example, 
a new program that will yield $100,000 in benefits and $10,000 in risk-adjusted 
compensatory damages is desirable, at least from an economic standpoint. But if 
switching to the program requires sufficiently expensive retraining or if it is likely to 
give rise to protracted litigation (adding >$90,000 in switching costs), the department 
might reasonably decide not to make the switch. The influence of switching costs on 
the effects of constitutional litigation can tilt toward either overdeterrence or 
underdeterrence: litigation-related costs will add to the deterrent value of a suit, 
potentially leading to overdeterrence; retraining-related costs, on the other hand, 




These critiques often lead to a sort of fatalism about constitutional deterrence: 
because constitutional litigation’s impact on wrongdoing is complicated, deterrence 
should be abandoned as a policy goal of constitutional torts (and then, presumably, 
largely ignored).121 But protecting constitutional rights is no less important in 
jurisdictions in which police departments are partially ignorant of or indifferent to 
the constitutional costs of their policies. Nor is the societal toll of overdeterrence 
diminished when political considerations lead the state to undervalue certain benefits 
of its policies. So long as constitutional tort suits remain a colorable path to recovery, 
litigation will continue to deter to some extent.122 And that deterrence is likely either 
to sweep too broadly or to fall short. Irrespective of the difficulty of obtaining such 
 
 
recovery of nominal damages); Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health 
& Hum. Res., 532 U.S. 598, 605 (2001) (refusing to award attorney’s fees when the lawsuit 
prompts a voluntary change in state policy); see generally Chen, supra note 84, at 915 
(discussing the Court’s growing reluctance to award attorney’s fees in the context of 
constitutional litigation). 
 121. The compensatory purpose of constitutional torts is regularly treated likewise. 
 122. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 21 (1980) (“It is almost axiomatic that the threat of 
damages has a deterrent effect.”); see also Richard Frankel, Regulating Privatized 
Government Through § 1983, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1449, 1515 (2009); John T. Parry, Judicial 
Restraints on Illegal State Violence: Israel and the United States, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 
73, 11–15 (2002); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976).  
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a goal, it is therefore important for constitutional tort law to be well tailored to 
achieve an optimal amount of litigation.123  
III. DECISION-MAKING BIASES 
Viewing constitutional torts through the instrumentalist lens of private law torts 
points also—through both its interpretive framework and the contrasts that it 
underscores between these two respective types of lawsuits—to another problem in 
this context: biases of state decisionmakers will distort the deterrent effect of 
constitutional tort damage awards.  
Since its creation as part of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 (“Klan Act”), a central 
aim of constitutional tort law has been to remedy the biases of state actors.124 The 
Klan had imposed its own “legal regime” across the South from 1868 to 1871, acting 
through vigilantes and members holding official positions in government to unravel 
the reforms introduced following the conclusion of the Civil War.125 The Klan Act 
specifically targeted such discriminatory animus, “aim[ing] to break the rebellion, 
restore order to the South, and vindicate the rights of Freedmen.”126 On the other 
hand, private law torts spring mainly from the common law and most typically 
concern circumstances in which no more than negligence is at issue.127 Reflecting 
this, Oliver Wendell Holmes (as well as subsequent scholars) rooted the development 
of tort law in the need to balance business interests against the harms that business 
can create.128 Despite these foundational differences, constitutional tort law has 
borrowed its central deterrence remedy—compensatory damage awards—from 
private law torts with little examination and no modification to account for any such 
 
 
 123. Cf. Meltzer, supra note 26, at 286 (“The Supreme Court has recognized the 
shortcomings of traditional tort remedies—and has accordingly embraced [different] 
deterrence remedies—most clearly in criminal cases like Hillery and Mapp.”). 
 124. See, e.g., Eric A. Harrington, Judicial Misuse of History and § 1983: Toward a 
Purpose-Based Approach, 85 TEX. L. REV. 999, 1006 (2007) (discussing § 1983); McLaughlin 
v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964) (discussing the Fourteenth Amendment); S. REP. 
NO. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.-94, at 6, (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. 
NEWS C.C.A.N. 5908, 5913 (discussing § 1988). 
 125. Harrington, supra note 124, at 1005–06. 
 126. Id. at 1006. 
 127. O. W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 111 (1881) (noting that the basis for tort 
liability is the failure “to use such care as a prudent man would under the circumstances”). 
Constitutional torts are not all intentional torts, see Gilles, supra note 89, at 857, and bias can 
also influence negligence, see infra Part III, but this distinction nevertheless illustrates an 
important difference between the purpose and circumstance of constitutional and private law 
torts. 
 128. Id. HOLMES, supra note 127 (noting also that this essential theory of negligence was 
established through judicial grants of immunity seeking to benefit businessmen and business 
enterprises); see also, e.g., LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 300 (2d 
ed. 1985) (examining the history of tort liability and concluding that it was driven by the 
Industrial Revolution, “to the age of engines and machines . . . [that] have a marvelous capacity 
to cripple and maim their servants”). 
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distinctions.129  
This Part defines and describes bias, providing a foundation for understanding the 
scope of bias’s impact on decision-making in the constitutional context. By 
influencing the judgment of state actors, bias may distort the systemic effect of 
compensatory damage awards, skewing the balance between the competing interests 
at stake. 
A. Bias’s Many Influences  
For purposes of this Article, the term “bias” describes a disposition that leads to 
an incorrect or improper valuation of an action’s costs or benefits.130 Bias need not 
be contemptible to influence the deterrent effect of constitutional litigation—a 
policymaker may, for example, be biased toward a discredited interrogation method, 
like polygraph evidence.131 But when suboptimal policy determinations are based on 
innocent mistakes, like a misplaced faith in the reliability of polygraphs, the damage 
done to the underlying deterrence interests is no less great than when policy 
miscalculations stem from invidious motives. 
Bias influences deterrence in three primary ways. First, bias may contribute to 
misconceptions around key facts or assumptions—like in the polygraph example. In 
effect, this form of bias taints the decision in question. This can be illustrated by 
returning yet again to the chokehold hypothetical: Imagine, now, that the police 
department in question is predominantly white and is policing a predominantly non-
white neighborhood. Such a department should not pursue a chokehold policy that 
produces $80,000 in benefits and $100,000 in costs. But what if the relevant 
decisionmaker in the department believes, as a result of her racial biases, that the 
population in question is more violent than is actually the case, and that the 
chokehold policy will therefore produce $120,000 in benefits? Such a department 
will proceed with a chokehold policy that, under efficient deterrence theory, it should 
reject—because racial bias leads the relevant decisionmaker to overvalue the 
presumptive benefits of the policy.  
 
 
 129. Private law torts may not, of course, be entirely untouched by such influences. But for 
a variety of reasons, prejudice and other bias presents a greater concern in the context of 
constitutional wrongdoing. Private investors, for example, have a strong self-interest in 
ensuring that firm managers do not act irrationally at the cost of firm profits, and so firm 
managers who fall victim to decision-making biases will be replaced. See, e.g., Edward Rubin, 
Commentary, Rational States? 83 VA. L. REV. 1433, 1438 (1997); Levinson, supra note 25, 
at 355. And those firms that fail to successfully winnow out biased managers will eventually 
fail, leading to a sort of market-based natural selection that will favor firms that effectively 
guard against bias. Id. Still, the impact of bias on private law decision-making has also been 
overlooked. I will explore this question in a subsequent article. 
 130. This is, essentially, a reformulation of Kenneth Arrow’s widely used definition of 
discrimination as “the valuation in the market place of personal characteristics of the worker 
that are unrelated to worker productivity.” TITO BOERI & JAN VAN OURS, Antidiscrimination 
Legislation in THE ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECT LABOR MARKETS 95 (2d ed. 2013). 
 131. See Renée McDonald Hutchins, You Can’t Handle the Truth! Trial Juries and 
Credibility, 44 SETON HALL L. REV. 505, 529 n.99 (2014). Such a policymaker may overvalue 
the benefits of using polygraph evidence, leading to an overuse of polygraph testing.  
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Second, bias can create nonpecuniary value—like the illicit joy that springs from 
harming a member of a disfavored community—that will directly add to the costs or 
benefits that underlie constitutional decision-making.132 For example, a sheriff who 
derives racist utility from a chokehold policy that injures a particular racial minority 
will be less deterred by the threat of compensatory damages than a sheriff who does 
not.133 Similarly, a sheriff who answers to a community that derives, in the aggregate, 
net racist utility from a chokehold policy that injures a particular racial minority 
group will be less deterred by the threat of compensatory damages than a sheriff who 
does not: even if the sheriff herself is not racist, the political benefits of appeasing 
her electorate will influence whatever decisions she makes. 
Finally, when the nonpecuniary value that springs from bias influences 
individuals making decisions with collective impacts, it will lead to agency-cost 
problems.134 This is because individual decisionmakers do not experience all of the 
societal benefits and costs of their actions, but they are fully affected by any personal 
benefits and costs. Bias-derived utility can therefore create circumstances in which 
the policy that maximizes utility for the individual decisionmaker is not the policy 
that maximizes utility for society.135 In the above chokehold hypothetical, for 
example, because the sheriff in question will only personally experience a fraction 
of the chokehold policy’s societal benefits (say, $800) and costs ($1,000), she need 
only derive a small amount of personal racism-related utility (>$200) to implement 
an inefficient policy: then the personal benefits ($800 + >$200) of the policy would 
exceed its personal costs ($1,000). Among other things, this illustrates the outsized 
impact that biases can have on decision-making; in this example, the sheriff need 
only derive $201 in personal utility from her bias to choose a policy that results in a 
net societal loss of $20,000 in utility. 
B. Are Bias’s Effects Improper? 
When bias undermines the decision-making process, by corrupting assumptions 
or by creating agency-cost problems, it presents a serious threat to the constitutional 
regulatory scheme. There are no acceptable circumstances from the standpoint of 
optimal deterrence in which bias leads decisionmakers to incorrectly value the costs 
or benefits of their actions or to maximize individual utility at the expense of societal 
utility. Any scheme reliant on deterrence depends also on the underlying decision-
making of the actors in question. And when a factor like bias systemically taints those 
 
 
 132. This is analogous to the “taste for discrimination” described by Gary Becker in the 
employment context; the utility that springs from bias will put a thumb on the scale of 
deterrence. GARY S. BECKER, ACCOUNTING FOR TASTES 140–41 (1998); see also BERNARD E. 
HARCOURT, AGAINST PREDICTION at 111–18 (2007) (mapping this theory on to police profiling 
determinations). 
 133. Whenever the net value of bias-derived utility is positive, [benefit-derived utility] + 
[bias-derived utility] > [benefit-derived utility].  
 134. Pecuniary effects can also give rise to agency-cost problems. See, e.g., 
Robert A. McBride, Policing for Profit: How Urban Municipalities’ Focus on Revenue Has 
Undermined Law Enforcement Legitimacy, 9 FAULKNER L. REV. 329, 331 (2018). 
 135. Cf. Coffee, supra note 37, at 1349 (outlining this problem in the context of mass torts). 
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decisions—especially when the result is uniform underdeterrence or 
overdeterrence—it undermines the whole system. 
It is less instantly clear, however, whether the utility that is directly produced from 
bias must be excluded from calculations of optimal deterrence: from a strictly 
utilitarian standpoint, the joy that a racist derives from her bigotry, as despicable that 
preference may be, also adds to the overall societal utility of the action in question.136 
Paradoxically, this would mean that optimal deterrence sometimes favors a policy 
because of, and not in spite of, that policy’s racist (or sexist, or xenophobic, etc.) 
consequences. 
Such a result is plainly untenable. Constitutional tort suits exist to enforce the 
policy aims of § 1983 and the Constitution, not to blindly maximize utility. Adopting 
an absolutist version of utilitarianism in this context, therefore, makes little sense. A 
more sensible approach may, instead, be to look to the policies underlying § 1983 
and the Constitution in determining what kinds of utility should factor into 
calculations of optimal deterrence. Utility derived from bias would not be 
incorporated into cost-benefit decision-making when doing so would thwart these 
policy goals.  
There are a number of biases that might give rise to such troubling utility. 
Classical prejudices, for example—racism, sexism, xenophobia, religious animosity, 
and other biases that relate to identity—are inherently inconsistent with the 
Constitution’s anti-discrimination goals. Indeed, it was the need for a remedy against 
racially biased state actors that gave rise to § 1983; and the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Equal Protection Clause was borne out of fears of racial prejudice.137 As such, it 
should not matter how much utility a state actor derives from discriminating on the 
basis of race, sex, national origin, religion, etc., for purposes of calculating whether 
the costs of that discriminatory action outweigh its benefit.  
Viewpoint-based biases—biases springing from the tendency to, intentionally or 
unintentionally, disfavor perspectives with which one disagrees—are likewise 
troubling from the standpoint of constitutional tort policy.138 When the state 
considers how aggressively to police a protest or what potentially unwholesome 
content to censor, the degree to which the relevant state actors sympathize with the 
underlying viewpoint may influence the state’s ultimate determination. Yet as the 
Supreme Court has made clear: “If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First 
Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea 
 
 
 136. Cf. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 41 (1974) (recognizing the 
theoretical challenge posed by “utility monsters,” individuals who get “enormously greater 
sums of gains in utility from any sacrifice of others than these others lose”). 
 137. Section 1983 was passed as part of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 to “target[] the 
Klan, including those members holding official positions in government.” Harrington, supra 
note 124, at 1006 (2007). For a description of the Fourteenth Amendment’s foundations, see 
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964) (noting the “historical fact that the central 
purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to eliminate racial discrimination emanating from 
official sources in the States”). Both § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment are phrased 
vaguely, presumably to act as a guard against discrimination more broadly.  
 138. Viewpoint bias may also result in favoritism displayed toward perspectives with 
which one agrees. 
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simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”139 Allowing 
the utility that springs from suppressing a disagreeable viewpoint to justify a policy 
that suppresses that viewpoint would thwart the First Amendment’s purposes.  
Not all biases that concerningly affect constitutional decision-making are, of 
course, invidious. Take, for example, bias toward law and order. The utility that 
results from the promotion of law and order is a natural, expected, and—at least to 
some extent—desirable goal of policing and governance. Yet an officer who 
overvalues the benefits of orderliness will nevertheless be suboptimally deterred 
from wrongdoing when the effect of that wrongdoing is to increase order.140 
Although such a mistake may be innocent or even well meaning, the effect—
underdeterrence—is still undesirable.141 Similarly, departmental solidarity, exhibited 
through the “thin blue line,” is an organizational strength of many service 
organizations, contributing to a cohesiveness and comradery that draws many to the 
field.142 But it also leads officers to be biased toward their colleagues—by, for 
example, adopting a “code of silence” in the face of accusations of wrongdoing—
and therefore toward behavior that fails to maximize overall societal utility.143 When 
these biases undermine the decision-making process, by tainting policymakers’ 
underlying assumptions or by creating agency-cost problems, it does not matter if 
the underlying reason was invidious or anodyne.  
C. Bias and Other Deterrence Skews 
Of course, bias does not affect deterrence in isolation; it will often work in 
conjunction with other factors that weigh on the deterrent impact of constitutional 
 
 
 139. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989). 
 140. For instance, strategically citing some of those who jaywalk may reflect an 
appropriate valuation of law and order as it applies to jaywalking, whereas detaining every 
jaywalker, using violence when necessary, likely overvalues the need to ensure adherence to 
this minor traffic law. Other than recognizing that absolute and ruthless enforcement of all 
laws will not be universally desirable, this Article does not take a position as to what specific 
laws demand what specific levels of enforcement. 
 141. Even such seemingly innocuous biases might stand in opposition to the Constitution’s 
goals. As the Supreme Court has recognized in the context of the First Amendment, “a certain 
amount of unrest and disorder is a price that must be paid lest there be only noncontroversial 
or impotent protest.” Note, Equity on the Campus: The Limits of Injunctive Regulation of 
University Protest, 80 YALE L.J. 987, 1005 (1971); City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 
471–72 (1987). Yet when sufficiently strong, the utility that springs from preferences for law 
and order may outweigh the costs that result from suppressing protest—leading optimal 
deterrence to favor the suppression of speech that the Constitution seeks to protect. Taken to 
its furthest extreme, it is possible to imagine a society in which government propaganda has 
convinced the broader population that upholding laws and maintaining order is sufficiently 
valuable such that the costs of any constitutional wrongdoing in pursuit of that goal are 
overwhelmed by the brainwashed public’s utility gained from law and order. 
 142. Ann C. Hodges & Justin Pugh, Crossing the Thin Blue Line: Protecting Law 
Enforcement Officers Who Blow the Whistle, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. ONLINE 1, 10 (2018) 
(describing the unofficial “code of silence” common throughout law enforcement when it 
comes to testimony that may implicate a fellow officer). 
 143. See also Armacost, supra note 42, at 454. 
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litigation.  
This includes, first, the problem of economic costs translating unevenly into 
political costs.144 Indeed, one circumstance in which uneven translation is 
particularly likely to arise is when bias is present.145 One factor that may influence a 
population’s sensitivity to a tax increase is the underlying reasons for the increase in 
question;146 a community with racist preferences may be more willing to tolerate a 
tax increase when it results from a policy that injures a disfavored population—
thereby diminishing the political costs of such a policy.147  
Second, bias can aggravate the sorts of information-related problems that lead 
policymakers to fail to account for the liability costs of their decisions.148 Implicit in 
the goal of carefully monitoring policymaking liability is the idea that there should 
be checks on official policymaking. Law-and-order bias and intra-departmental bias, 
however, each weigh in favor of granting officials greater discretion—and therefore 
toward less oversight.149 Similarly, policymakers may be less likely to implement 
necessary information-gathering processes when a disfavored community would be 
the primary beneficiary of careful tracking.150 The likelihood that a government 
office is properly tracking its liability may therefore be tied, at least in part, to the 
biases held within that department. Moreover, when a department does not have 
adequate processes to track its liability, and deterrence therefore relies on individual 
officials noticing liability awards, bias may influence what awards are noticed or 
remembered. A state official biased against a religious minority, for example, may 
be less likely to remember (or “remember”) damage awards springing from policies 
that harm that minority population, thereby decreasing the deterrent effect of such 
liability.151  
Third, bias will lead to even greater unevenness in the pursuit and success of these 
suits, which will also have a distorting effect on the resulting deterrence. Bias in 
official decision-making will often reflect bias in the justice system and/or the 
community. This, in turn, will influence what cases are brought and what cases 
 
 
 144. See Levinson, supra note 25. 
 145. This is beyond the scope of Levinson’s article. Id. 
 146. See, e.g., Andrew D. Appleby, Pay at the Pump: How $11 Per Gallon Gasoline Can 
Solve the United States’ Most Pressing Challenges, 40 CUMB. L. REV. 3, 57 (2009). 
 147. This can cut both ways. In a racism-sensitive community like Portland, Oregon, the 
fact that an unconstitutional policy appears to have been motivated by racial bias might 
amplify the political consequences of any resultant economic damages.  
 148. Schwartz, supra note 106. 
 149. See supra Section II.D. 
 150. This sort of bias-induced carelessness may well have played a significant role in the 
Flint water crisis. See, e.g., Andrew Buncombe, Flint Water Crisis: Race ‘Was Factor’ in 
Authorities’ Slow and Misleading Response, Says City’s Black Mayor, INDEPENDENT (May 28, 
2018), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/flint-water-crisis-michigan 
-racism-city-mayor-karen-weaver-police-a8369981.html [https://perma.cc/93VM-AML9]. 
 151. This, also, can cut both ways. A Bosnian-American policymaker, for example, may 
be particularly likely to remember any constitutional liability that results from a policy that 
harms Bosnian-Americans, thereby inflating the relative deterrence effectuated by such 
awards. See, e.g., Henri Tajfel & John Turner, An Integrative Theory of Intergroup 
Conflict, in THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERGROUP RELATIONS 33 (William G. Austin & 
Stephen Worchel eds., 1979) (discussing how individuals favor members of their own group). 
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succeed—thereby changing the risk-adjusted cost of litigation. When a victim of 
constitutional wrongdoing ascribes to a disfavored viewpoint, for example, she may 
face a relatively uphill battle in obtaining counsel or in succeeding at trial152: the 
subset of Massachusetts-licensed attorneys who would consider representing a 
chapter of the KKK in a Takings claim is relatively small; and a typical 
Massachusetts jury is probably less likely to find in favor of a KKK victim, all else 
equal.153 Bias’s influence on liability determinations, moreover, extends beyond 
simply coloring the sympathies of jurors: numerous constitutional torts include legal 
elements vulnerable to bias. Whether police have used excessive force, for example, 
turns on, among other things, the factfinder’s assessment of how much danger the 
suspect in question presented to the arresting officer(s). A juror who has internalized 
an unfounded fear of a particular racial group will, because of her bias, be more likely 
to judge as reasonable an officer’s use of force against a member of that group.154 
Finally, the amount of stigma or even stress that results from a constitutional tort 
suit will depend, similarly, on workplace and community biases. A public health 
official accused of overzealously quarantining immigrants from a certain country 
may face little stigma—and might even be celebrated—in a town in which the 
immigrant population in question is disfavored or distrusted. Sheriff Joe Arpaio, for 
example, appears to have politically benefited from at least some of his unruly and 
constitutionally dubious stances and actions. Such effects cannot be universalized; a 
constitutional violation that is taboo in one community may be viewed as 
unremarkable or even desirable in another.155  
 
 
 152. These effects will also cut both ways. Even when it is not legally relevant, bias may 
be a persuasive part of a plaintiff’s narrative, and the apparent presence of certain types of bias 
in constitutional wrongdoing may induce high-quality plaintiffs’ firms, like the Southern 
Poverty Law Center, to take a case. In such circumstances, bias may give rise to contradictory 
effects on deterrence: official bias may create decision-making flaws that lead toward less 
deterrence while also increasing the likelihood of litigation and liability, thereby leading to 
more deterrence. Offsetting effects will be most common when official biases run counter to 
community preferences; whereas, the effects of bias are most likely to compound when the 
biases of governmental policymakers reflect biases in the broader community.  
 153. This isn’t to say that bias will always or even usually deprive such victims of a chance 
at redress. But by limiting the pool of potential attorneys and by precoloring the sympathies 
of the jury, bias will serve as an additional obstacle to liability judgments, thereby skewing 
the risk-adjusted costs of litigation. 
 154. Cf. Isabel Wilkerson, Mike Brown’s Shooting and Jim Crow Lynchings Have Too 
Much in Common. It’s Time for America to Own Up, GUARDIAN (Aug. 25, 2014), http://www 
.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/aug/25/mike-brown-shooting-jim-crow-lynchings-in-
common [https://perma.cc/FEW6-Q4FT] (discussing Mike Brown and other instances in 
which internalized racism influenced and then “justified” state action). By this same token, 
bias may also contribute to the calculation of compensatory damages or settlements. 
 155. This, too, illustrates qualified immunity’s clumsiness: qualified immunity applies 
with equal force irrespective of whether or to what extent bias influences the stress and stigma 
of litigation—including in circumstances in which community biases result in the celebration 
of those accused of constitutional wrongdoing. 
2021] THE CONSTITUTIONAL TORT SYSTEM  603 
 
D. Bias and Bias-Based Torts 
Bias is unique among factors that distort the constitutional tort system insofar as 
it is a required element of some constitutional torts: plaintiffs in such cases will not 
be able to recover without proving bias. The inclusion of bias as an element of a 
claim in some torts does not, however, in any way mitigate its systemic influence on 
deterrence. To the contrary, bias is especially a concern in such circumstances. 
Many constitutional violations do not directly turn on the motivations of the state 
actor in question. In First Amendment speech cases, for example, the legal inquiry 
often involves whether a facially non-discriminatory speech regulation is narrowly 
tailored to a significant government interest—a question in which bias is not an 
element.156 On the other hand, some constitutional violations do require a showing 
of some impermissible bias such as racial animus or hostility to speech.157 Section 
1985(3), for example, provides a federal cause of action, similar to § 1983, for 
victims targeted because of “racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously 
discriminatory animus”;158 it is impossible to succeed under § 1985(3) without 
showing bias.  
For claims that do not involve bias as an element, bias’s influence on deterrence 
is straightforward: when present, bias will weigh on the cost-benefit analysis, thereby 
skewing constitutional litigation’s deterrent effect. The question is less intuitive (but 
equally straightforward) for claims for which bias is a required element. On the one 
hand, the deterrent effect of such bias torts reaches only biased potential tortfeasors. 
But so long as damage awards remain predominantly compensatory, the inclusion of 
bias as an element of the tort will do nothing to mitigate bias’s distorting effect on 
deterrence. Indeed, the key difference between bias-required torts and bias-
indifferent torts is that when bias is an element of liability, there will be no possible 
tortfeasor for whom bias has not distorted the deterrent effect of constitutional 
litigation.  
 This may be illustrated with an example. Imagine two police departments 
considering two policies, one of which is justified largely on racial animus. If these 
policies create identical (let’s say $80,000 in) legitimate societal utility, and each of 
these policies give rise to identical (let’s say $100,000 in) risk-adjusted litigation 
costs, then efficient deterrence suggests identical results: that the policies should not 
be pursued. The question at the heart of efficient deterrence (do the policy’s costs—
$100,000—exceed its benefits—$80,000?) is not affected by the elements of the 
underlying tort. And insofar as the costs of a policy largely take the form of 
compensatory damage awards—which are determined by the nature of, and not the 
reasons for, the policy’s harm—the court’s recognition of bias as an element of the 
wrong in question will ensure no additional deterrence: the fact that one department 
was motivated by racial animus in adopting an identically harmful policy is 
 
 
 156. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968); see also, e.g., Graham v. 
Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989) (describing the Fourth Amendment’s objective 
reasonableness inquiry that does not turn on the actual motivations (improper or not) of the 
officer in question). 
 157. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). 
 158. Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 268 (1993) (quoting 
Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971)). 
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immaterial for purposes of calculating compensatory damages.159 Indeed, because 
bias is a difficult-to-prove additional element for liability, bias torts may provide less 
deterrence than non-bias torts; all else equal, including bias as a required element of 
liability will increase the risk of nonrecovery and thereby decrease the risk-adjusted 
cost of litigation.160 
IV. TAILORING DAMAGES TO DETERRENCE 
Treating constitutional torts more like private law torts helps clarify a number of 
problems. But it also suggests the possibility of a uniform solution. Each of these 
problems—the stress and stigma of litigation, economic-political cost translation 
effects, bias, and so forth—troubles the operation of the constitutional tort system by 
amplifying or diminishing the deterrent effect of compensatory damage awards. Such 
additive or detractive influences can, however, be offset by increasing or decreasing 
the damage award in question. Indeed, private law tort theory offers a number of 
proposals that do exactly this, including damage multipliers, damage caps, and 
proportional recovery.161  
A. Countering Underdeterrence Through Exemplary Damages 
When bias, governmental cost internalization failures, or something else renders 
compensatory damage awards inadequate, exemplary damages present a promising 
mechanism for nevertheless ensuring the optimal effect of constitutional torts.162  
 
 
 159. Because bias’s skewing effect is exogenous to a policy’s harmfulness, even if bias 
pushes decisionmakers toward actions that do more harm, and therefore give rise to more in 
compensatory damages, underdeterrence will nevertheless result. A bias-motivated chokehold 
policy giving rise to $110,000 in harms will only generate $110,000 in compensatory damages 
(and therefore $110,000 in deterrence)—enough to internalize all of the policy’s harms but 
none of bias’s influence. 
 160. It is possible that bias torts may be more likely to result in a judgment, or in higher 
settlements—although the opposite may be true as well: judges and juries are generally 
reluctant to formally recognize that a state actor was biased.  
 161. See, e.g., A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic 
Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 869, 890–91 (1998) (discussing advantages and disadvantages of 
these respective mechanisms for tailoring damage awards). 
 162. See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 50 (1983) (recognizing the importance of the 
availability of exemplary damages “if one assumes that there are substantial numbers of 
officers who will not be deterred by compensatory damages”). The term ‘exemplary damages’ 
is typically used interchangeably with ‘punitive damages.’ To avoid the retributivist 
connotations of ‘punitive,’ this Article uses ‘exemplary damages’ throughout. For others who 
have noted this semantic confusion, see, for example, Ciraolo v. City of New York, 216 F.3d 
236, 245 (2d Cir. 2000) (Calabresi, J., concurring) (noting that the term “‘punitive damages’ . 
. . contributes greatly to . . . confusion” because it “improperly emphasizes the retributive 
function of such extracompensatory damages at the expense of their multiplier-
deterrent function”); Polinsky et al., supra note 161, at 890–91 (“[T]he adjective ‘punitive’ 
may sometimes be misleading. This is because extracompensatory damages may be needed 
for deterrence purposes in circumstances in which the behavior of the defendant would not 
call for punishment.”) (emphasis omitted); cf. Sharkey, supra note 117, at 364–65 (“[I]t makes 
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This may be illustrated by returning, briefly, to this Article’s discussion of the 
problem in Parts I and II. Optimal deterrence entails weighing a policy’s benefits [b] 
against its costs [c]. A policy is justified under efficient deterrence theory when 
[b]>[c]. Stress and stigma, bias, and so forth, however, skew this equation. When a 
sheriff derives $10,000 in improper bias-related utility from a policy, for example, 
she will consider whether [b] + $10,000 > [c].163 This Part proposes adding a 
reciprocal amount of exemplary damages and thereby proportionally increasing the 
costs of wrongdoing: under the proposed exemplary damages regime, the sheriff 
would consider whether [b] + $10,000 > [c] + $10,000—i.e., whether [b]>[c]. Such 
a reform could be applied to address any one factor, or any combination of factors, 
that skews the systemic effect of constitutional torts.164 
This use of exemplary damage awards resembles a Pigouvian tax correcting for 
systemic failures in constitutional deterrence.165 The direct impact of such a remedy 
would be to internalize one or more of these skewing effects in the manner described 
above, preserving optimal deterrence. But direct deterrence will only reach parties 
who know that they are so influenced. Although a sheriff who recognizes that his 
decision is motivated in part by bias-derived utility can anticipate and incorporate 
the cost of bias-related exemplary damages into his decision-making, a policymaker 
who mistakenly believes that a community is more dangerous than it actually is will 
not understand that her belief is mistaken, let alone influenced by bias. She will 
therefore not be swayed by the possibility of any resulting bias-related damages in 
her decisions. 
This may not, however, be a major concern: exemplary damages will also give 
rise to indirect, institutional effects that will reach even unknowingly or 
unconsciously affected decisionmakers. This will be true if vicarious liability is 
adopted in this context, but it also will be true if the costs of these deterrence failures 
continue to be imposed on states and municipalities through indemnification: either 
way, exemplary damages serve as a powerful incentive to implement policies that 
 
 
sense to entertain seriously the idea of a nonretributive rationale for punitive damages.”). 
 163. For a discussion of what it means for bias-derived utility to be “improper,” see supra 
Section III.B. Given the prevalence of settlements in this context, it may not be possible to 
tailor deterrence this precisely. Nevertheless, increasing the presumptive value of a judgment 
will also increase the settlement value, and so the prevalence of settlements will not necessarily 
thwart this proposal. 
 164. Indeed, using exemplary damages to correct deterrence failures related to uneven 
enforcement follows directly from the rich body of private law tort scholarship on the use of 
damage multipliers in circumstances in which the risk of non-recovery undermines the 
deterrence effect of compensatory awards. See generally, e.g., Polinksy et al., supra note 161 
(proposing damage multipliers to account for risk-of-nonrecovery problems). When only half 
of all constitutional wrongs result in a compensatory damage award, doubling the total 
damages via exemplary damage awards will counteract the underdeterrence that would 
otherwise result. See, e.g., id.; Robert D. Cooter, Punitive Damages for Deterrence: When and 
How Much? 40 ALA. L. REV. 1143, 1148 (1989); Polinsky et al., supra note 161. 
 165. Pigouvian taxes are taxes on activities that generate negative externalities. See, e.g., 
Thomas Merrill & David M. Schizer, Energy Policy for an Economic Downturn: A Proposed 
Petroleum Fuel Price Stabilization Plan, 27 YALE J. REG. 1, 4 (2010). Pigouvian taxes are 
generally set to match the marginal cost of the externality in question so as to correct the 
resulting market failure. Id. 
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guard against even unconscious deterrence failures.166 A state that is indirectly 
penalized for its health department’s failure to track its liability-related expenditures 
will take steps to better track such costs; and a municipality that knows its hiring, 
firing, supervising, and policymaking decisions each could give rise to bias-related 
liability will take steps to moderate the influence of bias in and through such 
decisions.167 
B. Countering Overdeterrence Through Damage Reductions 
Exemplary damages cannot, however, be used when faults in the constitutional 
tort system lead to overdeterrence. This is because exemplary damages are a one-
way ratchet: they only add to the costs of constitutional tort suits and therefore can 
only increase their deterrence value. If exemplary damages function as a quasi-
Pigouvian tax on state bias, this Article’s framework suggests the need also for a 
Pigouvian subsidy-like reform: a way to decrease the deterrent effect of 
constitutional litigation. Private tort law also provides several such mechanisms, 
including damage proportional liability;168 when the stress and stigma of litigation, 
bias, or some other factor appears likely to lead to overdeterrence, compensatory 
damage awards should be accordingly reduced to below-compensatory levels.169  
Such a reduction might appear to strike at constitutional tort law’s compensatory 
purposes.170 To the extent that it does, this shouldn’t necessarily doom the proposal. 
As the doctrine of qualified immunity makes clear, the Supreme Court, at least, 
 
 
 166. Armacost, supra note 42, at 505–06. Such an increased use of exemplary damages 
could discourage the practice of indemnification. It seems unlikely, however, that holding 
individual officers accountable for their departments’ policymaking failures will result in 
fewer departments paying exemplary awards on their officers’ behalf. See generally Schwartz, 
supra note 38, at 890 (observing that every single officer in her nationwide study was 
indemnified for exemplary damages). 
 167. For example, research suggests that African Americans are less susceptible to anti-
African American biases, and so ensuring that policies that impact predominantly African- 
American communities are made by or in consultation with African-American policymakers 
could be an effective step toward diminishing the influence of conscious and unconscious anti-
African American biases. See, e.g., R. Richard Banks, Jennifer L. Eberhardt & Lee 
Ross, Discrimination and Implicit Bias in a Racially Unequal Society, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1169, 
1190 (2006); Anthony G. Greenwald, Mark A. Oakes & Hunter G. Hoffman, Targets of 
Discrimination: Effects of Race on Responses to Weapons Holders, 39 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 399 (2003); E. Ashby Plant, B. Michelle Peruche & David A. Butz, Eliminating 
Automatic Racial Bias: Making Race Non-Diagnostic for Responses to Criminal Suspects, 41 
J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 141 (2005) (showing mixed success in training subjects to 
minimize effects of this bias). 
 168. Damage caps, which are not Pigouvian-like, also will lead to such an end. 
 169. This would operate in the same manner as exemplary damages described above: when 
bias detracts from the perceived benefits of a policy, for example, subtracting an equivalent 
amount from the damages awarded will counterbalance its influence. Expressed 
algorithmically, where [b] - $10,000 > [c], the costs could be adjusted such that [b] - $10,000 
> [c] - $10,000, or [b] > [c]. 
 170. Cf., e.g., Hardin v. Straub, 490 U.S. 536, 539 (1989) (identifying “§ 1983’s chief goals 
[as] compensation and deterrence”). 
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believes that overdeterrence in this context is a sufficiently serious concern to require 
the sacrifice of some amount of otherwise deserved compensatory relief.171 Damage 
caps and proportionally tailored liability demand less of a loss of compensation than 
qualified immunity.172  
Compromise may be unnecessary, though; it is possible to guard against 
overdeterrence without sacrificing compensation. Looking again to the private law, 
the doctrine of cy pres provides a possible model for a solution. Cy pres is an 
equitable practice used in class actions, in which judges distribute portions of the 
judgments or settlements to uninvolved charitable interests.173 Applying this general 
principle—that equity sometimes demands decoupling the plaintiff’s recovery from 
the judgment itself—exemplary damage awards from previous suits could be used to 
create a common fund for offsetting downward adjustments to compensatory damage 
awards.174 So long as underdeterrence is at least as big of a problem as 
overdeterrence, the amounts of exemplary damages collected would be sufficient to 
ensure that every injured plaintiff is made whole. Where, for example, a $10,000 
exemplary damage award was necessary to internalize the effects of bias and ensure 
optimal deterrence, this $10,000 would then be available in a subsequent case to 
compensate an injured plaintiff for any reduction to her compensatory damage 
award. In effect, therefore, deterrence-related exemplary damages would be used as 
insurance dedicated to preserving the compensatory role of constitutional litigation 
even when optimal deterrence militates that some plaintiffs receive sub-
compensatory relief. 
There is nothing inherently problematic with using exemplary damages in this 
manner. Plaintiffs have no moral or legal entitlement to exemplary damages awarded 
to deter rather than to punish.175 Therefore, redistributing these awards would simply 
deprive certain plaintiffs of what would otherwise be a windfall.176 Indeed, this 
 
 
 171. And, as Section IV.D discusses, this Article’s approach likely represents a more 
effective and more efficient approach. 
 172. Another advantage of damage caps or proportionally reduced damage awards is that 
they would still result in a judgment, thereby facilitating any expressive or civil recourse-
related goals of the constitutional tort system. Cf. John C. P. Goldberg, The Constitutional 
Status of Tort Law: Due Process and the Right to a Law for the Redress of Laws Wrongs, 115 
YALE L. J. 524, 621–22 (2005). 
 173. See Chris J. Chasin, Comment, Modernizing Class Action Cy Pres Through 
Democratic Inputs: A Return to Cy Pres Comme Possible, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1463, 1469 
(2015). 
 174. This proposal follows, generally, from private law scholarship on decoupling. See, 
e.g., Albert Choi & Chris William Sanchirico, Should Plaintiffs Win What Defendants Lose? 
Litigation Stakes, Litigation Effort, and the Benefits of Decoupling, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 323 
(2004); Mitchell Polinsky & Yeon-Koo Che, Decoupling Liability: Optimal Incentives for 
Care and Litigation, 22 RAND J. ECON. 562 (1991); David Rosenberg, Decoupling 
Deterrence and Compensation Functions in Mass Tort Class Actions for Future Loss, 88 VA. 
L. REV. 1871 (2002).  
 175. Cf. Noah Smith-Drelich, Performative Causation, 93 S. CALIF. L. REV. 379 (2020) 
(discussing theoretical justifications for proportional liability). 
 176. See, e.g., Sharkey, supra note 117, at 370 n.65 (“[T]hat the damages are paid to the 
plaintiff is, from an economic standpoint, a detail. It is payment by the defendant that creates 
incentives for more efficient resource use. The transfer of the money to the plaintiff affects his 
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proposal would redistribute exemplary damages in a manner that facilitates tort 
law’s—and, specifically, constitutional tort law’s—goals of deterrence and 
compensation; defendants would pay an amount necessary to ensure that they are 
optimally deterred while plaintiffs would receive an amount necessary to ensure that 
they are fully compensated.177 
C. Current Legal Status of Damage Tailoring 
What, if any, aspects of this Article’s proposal can be adopted under existing law? 
The answer is, surprisingly, a great deal: because qualified immunity screens out all 
but intentional or reckless constitutional violations—which is conveniently also the 
Supreme Court’s standard for awarding exemplary damages—exemplary damage 
awards are currently available to amplify the deterrent effect in nearly every case that 
survives to the liability stage of litigation.178 Reducing compensatory damages to 
subcompensatory levels, on the other hand, may fall too far afield of anything 
approved under the common law to be adopted without congressional intervention, 
even if plaintiffs are nevertheless fully compensated through redistributed exemplary 
awards. But this Article’s examination nevertheless suggests the need for some 
reform in this respect. 
1. Adding Deterrence Through Exemplary Damages  
This Article’s proposal for exemplary damages can be largely adopted to 
supplement qualified immunity under even a narrow and uncontroversial reading of 
the Supreme Court’s standard for § 1983 damage awards: nearly any case that 
survives qualified immunity will also satisfy the burden for exemplary damages.179  
In Smith v. Wade, the Supreme Court held that punitive damages could be awarded 
under § 1983 “when the defendant’s conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive 
or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally 
protected rights of others.”180 The “reckless or callous indifference” or “evil motive” 
in question pertains to the tortfeasor’s “knowledge that [he] may be acting in 
violation of federal law, not [his] awareness that [he] is engaging in 
 
 
wealth but does not affect efficiency or value.” (footnote omitted) (quoting RICHARD A. 
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 78 (1972))).  
 177. This would also have the benefit of mitigating the tendency for exemplary damages 
to incentivize frivolous litigation or to motivate plaintiffs to take insufficient precautions. See, 
e.g., Polinsky et al., supra note 161, at 923. 
 178. If, however, the doctrine of qualified immunity is either substantially changed or 
eliminated entirely, this Article’s proposal will have to remain limited largely to those 
circumstances in which qualified immunity would have applied. Cf. Ciraolo v. City of New 
York, 216 F.3d 236, 242 (2d Cir. 2000) (Calabresi, J., concurring) (calling for the Court to 
revisit municipalities’ immunity to punitive damages); Gilles, supra note 89, at 871 (same). 
 179. The fact that few courts actually do award exemplary damages under § 1983 is not a 
reflection of the limited permissibility of such awards; it instead reflects what is, this Article 
suggests, an ill-informed practice of reserving exemplary damages for truly extraordinary 
circumstances. 
 180. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 54–55 (1983). 
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discrimination.”181 Put more simply, exemplary damages are permitted for reckless 
or intentional violations of the law.  
Qualified immunity, in turn, allows cases to proceed against only reckless or 
intentional tortfeasors: “qualified immunity . . . provides ample protection to all but 
the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.”182 This means that 
for all nonmunicipal defendants subject to damage awards,183 exemplary damages 
are thus available.184  
The primary doctrinal limitation on exemplary damages awarded for deterrence 
purposes will instead be the Court’s due process jurisprudence. In State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, the Court imposed a de facto single-digit cap 
on the ratio of exemplary damages to compensatory damages.185 Therefore, in the 
event that optimal deterrence requires a ten-to-one or higher ratio of exemplary-to-
compensatory damages, Campbell may stand as an obstacle to fully implementing 
this Article’s proposed use of exemplary damages.186 More fundamentally, Philip 
Morris USA v. Williams forbids the award of exemplary damages based on injuries 
to nonparties.187 In some circumstances, this Article’s proposal would base 
exemplary damages on the conduct of nonparties, which raises even greater due 
 
 
 181. Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 535–36 (1999) (discussing and applying 
the § 1983 standard set forth in Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. at 30, 37, to § 1981 actions). 
 182. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 343 (1986). If there is any space between “plain[] 
incompeten[ce]” and recklessness, it is small: for public officials, to violate “clearly 
established” federal law approaches constituting recklessness per se. Id. at 349; see 
Recklessness, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (Garner ed. 2005) (defining recklessness as 
“[c]onduct whereby the actor does not desire harmful consequence but . . . foresees the 
possibility and consciously takes the risk” or, alternatively, as “[a] state of mind in which a 
person does not care about the consequences of his or her actions”). 
 183. Municipal defendants cannot assert qualified immunity, but they are also not subject 
to exemplary damages. City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 259–602 (1981). 
As a result, municipal defendants would represent the biggest gap in this Article’s proposed 
deterrence regime. Although suits against municipal defendants only account for a small 
proportion of damages awarded through constitutional litigation, municipal immunity from 
punitive damages should therefore be reconsidered. See supra Section II.A (suggesting 
changes to vicarious liability in this context); see also Filarsky v. Delia, 566 U.S. 377, 392 
(2012) (holding that qualified immunity applies to all but several narrow categories of non-
state actors). 
 184. See, e.g., Ngo v. Reno Hilton Resort Corp., 140 F.3d 1299, 1302 (9th Cir.), opinion 
amended on denial of reh’g, 156 F.3d 988 (9th Cir. 1998) (“[B]ecause the state of mind 
required to prove a Section 1983 violation was as high as that required to sustain a punitive 
damage award at common law, a plaintiff who satisfied the former standard necessarily 
satisfied the latter.”). But cf. Meltzer, supra note 26, at 277–78 (speculating that the Court’s 
criminal constitutional deterrence regime might be explained by the hypothesis that “the Court 
is not fully comfortable empowering defendants as private attorneys general to seek remedies 
whose primary or exclusive purpose is general deterrence of constitutional violations”). 
 185. 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003). 
 186. But see infra Section IV.E (discussing an incremental approach). Campbell may also 
not be an obstacle: it is unclear whether caps on punitive damage ratios should (or do) apply 
to all intentional torts, which often result in only nominal damage awards. 
 187. 549 U.S. 346, 353 (2007); see infra Section IV.E (discussing how it may be possible 
to identify the existence of bias by looking beyond the circumstances of the case at issue). 
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process concerns—at least to the extent that the legal fiction of individual liability is 
maintained in this context.188 For example, exemplary damages would be justified 
under this Article’s proposal against an officer using a chokehold pursuant to a biased 
chokehold policy, even if bias did not play a role in the individual tortfeasor’s 
decision to use the chokehold in question. However, by more formally recognizing 
vicarious liability or otherwise ensuring that liability burdens in this context actually 
fall on departments and municipalities—while also eliminating the Court’s bar on 
punitive damages against municipalities—such due process concerns could be 
lessened.189 Alternatively, courts could more consciously tailor § 1988 attorney’s 
fees to these underlying deterrence interests: a court might resist awarding attorney’s 
fees except when bias, informational problems, or some other factor leads 
compensatory damage awards to fall short and then award only partial attorney’s fees 
unless deterrence demands a full award.190 Such a use of § 1988 would be consistent 
with the statute’s motivating purpose.191  
2. Reducing Deterrence Through Diminished Compensatory Damages  
The second part of this Article’s proposed reform, the suggestion that 
overdeterrence can be combatted through compensatory damage reductions, may 
require congressional action to be adopted: although this proposal would satisfy the 
 
 
 188. See Schwartz, supra note 38.  
 189. See SCHUCK, supra note 42 at 68–70 (arguing for governmental enterprise liability). 
Because such changes are consistent with modern tort law’s evolving conception of injury and 
responsibility, the Court could adopt them under § 1983. Compare Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 
30, 34 (1983) (noting that the Court, in its § 1983 jurisprudence, “look[s] first to the common 
law of torts (both modern and as of 1871)” (emphasis added)), id. at 34 n.2 (“[I]f the 
prevailing view on some point of general tort law had changed substantially in the intervening 
century . . . we might be highly reluctant to assume that Congress intended to perpetuate a 
now-obsolete doctrine.”), Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 420 (1976) (recognizing a 
common-law immunity—prosecutorial immunity—that first came into existence twenty-five 
years after § 1983 was enacted), and City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 
258–59 (1981) (“[T]he Court’s willingness to recognize certain traditional immunities as 
affirmative defenses has not led it to conclude that Congress incorporated all immunities 
existing at common law.”), with Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 268 (1993) (implying 
that the Court can add immunities not recognized in 1871 under § 1983, but that it cannot 
abrogate immunities that were well-recognized at that time), and Baude, supra note 8, at 54–
55 & n.43 (noting that “it is the Court’s position now” to look only to “traditional common 
law”). If the Court is bound by immunities recognized in 1871, City of Newport v. Fact 
Concerts, Inc. recognized that “[b]y the time Congress enacted what is now § 1983, the 
immunity of a municipal corporation from punitive damages at common law was not open to 
serious question.” 453 U.S. at 247, 259 (1981). 
 190. One potentially important consequence of relying on tailored attorney’s fees in this 
manner is that it would shift the question from one for a jury to one for a judge. 
 191. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988; S. REP. NO. 94-1011, at 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 
(1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5908, 5913. Another 
possible limitation comes from dicta in Ziglar v. Abbasi, where Justice Kennedy noted that 
these general sorts of determinations are best left to the legislature. 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1858 
(2017). 
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compensatory and deterrence purposes of tort law—especially if redistributed 
exemplary damage awards are used to make injured plaintiffs whole—it may 
nevertheless fall too far afield of any remedy recognized in the common law to be 
adopted by judicial action alone.  
As the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized, to resolve questions about what 
types or amounts of damages for § 1983 suits are appropriate, courts should look to 
“principles derived from the common law of torts.”192 Although this Article’s 
proposed use of exemplary damages to guard against underdeterrence is consistent 
with the common law understanding of exemplary damage awards—courts, 
including the Supreme Court, have regularly approved similar uses of exemplary 
damages193—there is no established corresponding approach to overdeterrence in the 
common law.194 As a result, even if it would satisfy the policy aims of § 1983 to 
sometimes reduce damage awards to sub-compensatory levels, this is not a part of 
the reform that can be unilaterally adopted by the courts.195 
Yet ad hoc attempts to limit (and amplify) the effect of constitutional litigation 
may already occur throughout the legal system in the form of rights-manipulation. 
As Richard Fallon argues, “we should not think of the right to sue . . . for damages 
relief as a constant . . . . The availability of a right to sue is as much a variable as 
official immunity.”196 As a result, “[t]he definition of rights” may “vary with social 
costs,” with courts taking social costs into account in defining the scope and reach of 
 
 
 192. See, e.g., Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 305 (1986); see also 
Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 31 (1983). The Supreme Court has taken this dictate seriously, 
starting, and usually ending, its discussion of constitutional tort damages with references to 
the Restatements, Prosser on Torts, and other such seminal sources. See also supra note 189; 
cf. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 22 (1980) (analogizing Bivens to § 1983 in the context of 
exemplary damage awards). Section 1985(3), on the other hand, is not, exactly. See Griffin v. 
Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971) (noting that § 1985(3)’s invidious intent requirement 
ensures that the statute does not become “a general federal tort law”). 
 193. See, e.g., BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 582 (1996) (acknowledging, 
as one permissible justification for punitive damages, the difficulty of detecting an injury); 
Perez v. Z Frank Oldsmobile, Inc., 223 F.3d 617, 621 (7th Cir. 2000) (Easterbrook, J.) 
(“Frauds often escape detection, and the need to augment deterrence of concealable offenses 
is a principal justification of punitive damages.”); Ciraolo v. City of New York, 216 F.3d 236, 
244–45 (2d Cir. 2000) (Calabresi, J., concurring) (approving of this use of punitive damages 
while noting the roots of tort law’s “multiplier” idea in Gary Becker’s criminal deterrence 
scholarship); Kemezy v. Peters, 79 F.3d 33, 35 (7th Cir. 1996) (Posner, C.J.) (“When a tortious 
act is concealable, a judgment equal to the harm done by the act will underdeter.”). 
 194. One statutory response to overdeterrence has been damage caps on compensatory 
awards, which do entail reducing compensatory damages to below-compensatory levels in 
certain circumstances. Such damage caps, however, have been almost exclusively statutory 
and, therefore, should not be considered part of even the modern common law of tort remedies. 
See, e.g., Scott DeVito & Andrew Jurs, An Overreaction to A Nonexistent Problem: Empirical 
Analysis of Tort Reform from the 1980s to 2000s, 3 STAN. J. COMPLEX LITIG. 62, 69 (2015). 
 195. See Shaakirrah R. Sanders, Uncapping Compensation in the Gore Punitive Damage 
Analysis, 24 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 37, 40 (2015) (noting that “[c]ap-approving courts 
hold that legislative authority includes the power to alter common law rights 
to compensatory damages”). 
 196. Fallon, supra note 26, at 965. 
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rights.197 In other words, courts may tailor constitutional tort recovery to accomplish 
this essential set of goals by limiting or expanding the rights at stake, as they may 
already be doing in the context of free exercise.198 If true, this Article’s proposal 
would formalize and lend transparency to a practice that has already been adopted, 
albeit in an ad hoc manner. 
D. Tailored Damages and Qualified Immunity 
This Article’s proposal of tailoring damage awards to deterrence addresses, 
among other things, the primary policy basis for qualified immunity: the chilling 
effect that the stress and stigma of litigation has on desirable state action. As such, 
this Article’s proposed reform presents a direct, and potentially preferable, 
alternative to the controversial doctrine.  
One advantage that this Article’s proposal has over qualified immunity is that its 
proportional approach can be more precisely tailored to deterrence and be applied 
broadly to counterbalance any factor that gives rise to overdeterrence. This approach 
will also result in closer-to-full compensation for victims of constitutional 
wrongdoing than will qualified immunity. Even if deterrence-based exemplary 
awards from other cases are not used (or are insufficient) to offset reductions in 
compensatory damages, because tailored damages entail only reducing 
compensatory damages as much as is necessary to counterbalance problematic 
influences on deterrence, plaintiffs may still be left with some compensation for their 
injuries. On the other hand, because qualified immunity dismisses cases outright, it 
will always entail denying plaintiffs any compensatory relief whatsoever. 
Moreover, because this Article’s proposal combats overdeterrence via post-
judgment relief, it will facilitate the continued development of constitutional law. 
This, in turn, will lead to fewer instances in which the constitutionality of a policy or 
action remains unclear and, consequently, to fewer instances in which state actors 
may reasonably be mistaken about the appropriateness of their actions.199 Qualified 
immunity, on the other hand, operates prejudgment, simultaneously discouraging the 
development of constitutional law—after Pearson v. Callahan, courts may apply 
qualified immunity without resolving the underlying constitutional question200—
while dismissing cases because constitutional law is underdeveloped.201 
 
 
 197. Id. at 967–68; see, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 247–48 (1976); Emp’t 
Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878–79 (1990); see also Daryl J. Levinson, 
Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 857, 889–90 (1999) 
(labeling this practice “remedial deterrence”). 
 198. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 26, at 968. 
 199. In this very general sense, this Article’s proposal is consistent with James Pfander’s 
proposal that plaintiffs should be able to avoid qualified immunity (and facilitate the 
development of constitutional law) by challenging conduct for only nominal damages. See 
James E. Pfander, Resolving the Qualified Immunity Dilemma: Constitutional Tort Claims for 
Nominal Damages, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1601–28 (2011). 
 200. 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009). 
 201. See, e.g., Aaron L. Nielson & Christopher J. Walker, The New Qualified Immunity, 
89 S. CALIF. L. REV. 1, 2 (2015) (showing that Pearson has resulted in some freezing of 
constitutional development); see also Jonathan M. Freiman, The Problem of Qualified 
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Qualified immunity is not, however, without its advantages. For one, qualified 
immunity sets forth a relatively clear standard, at least in theory.202 As a result, state 
officials can reasonably predict whether they will be held liable before acting. 
Predicting by how much a court will reduce compensatory damages, on the other 
hand, is a far more challenging proposition, especially because the whims of 
individual judges could lead to some variability in damage award adjustments.203 
Although better-developed and defined applications of this Article’s proposal will 
help, a system that is inherently ad hoc will be less predictable on an individual basis 
than a system defined by a bright-line rule, especially one like qualified immunity 
that is geared toward individual decision-making.204 Collectively, though, the 
opposite may be true: because individual variations in proportional judgments will 
have less of an impact on the overall cost burden to departments than do individual 
variations in the strictly dichotomous liability or no liability qualified immunity 
decision, this Article’s proposal could lead toward greater institutional cost 
predictability—even while it decreases individual-level cost predictability.  
An additional potential advantage of qualified immunity is its early applicability, 
which, through its forestalling of the burdens of litigation, offers greater protection 
against overdeterrence than is available under this Article’s proposal.205 As a result, 
if there are categories of cases in which reducing compensatory awards to zero will 
still result in too much deterrence, qualified immunity will lead to closer-to-optimal 
outcomes. There are two potential responses to this.  
First, the Pigouvian subsidy-like reform suggested by this Article need not stop 
applying when compensatory damage awards are zeroed out: in circumstances in 
which overdeterrence is sufficiently great, defendants could be compensated (again, 
potentially funded with redistributed exemplary damage awards) so as to obtain 
optimal deterrence.206 For example, an officer forced to endure costly and 
embarrassing litigation for alleged wrongdoing who is ultimately vindicated at trial 
could be remunerated for his hassle. Somewhat disconcertingly, this approach could 
also lead to courts compensating even those officers held liable for constitutional 
wrongdoing so as to partially offset the burdens of litigation. Yet, as counterintuitive 
as this seems, such a result represents a substantial advantage over qualified 
immunity, as it provides a mechanism for negating the overdeterrence effected by 
the stigma and inconvenience of litigation in successful cases. For example, efficient 
deterrence favors an action that creates $1000 in societal harms and $1500 in societal 
benefits. Where, however, such an action will result in a suit that imposes $2000 in 
litigation-related burdens on a defendant, compensatory damages could be reduced 
to $0 and overdeterrence would nevertheless ensue (because the costs of wrongdoing 
 
 
Immunity: How Conflating Microeconomics and Law Subverts the Constitution, 34 IDAHO L. 
REV. 61, 80 (1997). 
 202. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 343, 341 (1986). 
 203. This predictability problem could be obviated by implementing a statutory system 
with clear-cut triggers and automatic damage adjustments.  
 204. However, as Section II.A indicates, qualified immunity’s emphasis on individual-
level deterrence is likely misplaced.  
 205. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001). 
 206. Cf. Fallon, supra note 26, at 940 (“It would be colossally imprudent to furnish damage 
remedies to everyone [victimized by some act of constitutional wrongdoing].”). 
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to the defendant, $2000, would exceed the benefits of acting, $1500). As perverse as 
it would appear to compensate the tortfeasor in this circumstance for her 
wrongdoing, if >$500 in compensation is not provided, the costs of acting will 
exceed the benefits and overdeterrence will result. Such a compensated tortfeasor 
would still be deterred, albeit through the partially offset burdens of litigation.207   
If the idea of compensating constitutional wrongdoers is sufficiently unpalatable, 
however, another reform could be to preserve the doctrine of qualified immunity in 
some form or for some circumstances. For example, as Myriam Gilles has observed, 
qualified immunity appears directed toward protecting state actors from negligent 
heat-of-the-moment decisions.208 But the doctrine currently applies—at least in 
theory—to constitutional wrongdoing that arises from both situationally rushed and 
careful decision-making. Limiting qualified immunity to only exigent circumstances 
would better tailor the standard’s application to the subset of behaviors most likely 
to implicate its underlying concerns.209  
Regardless of whether the doctrine of qualified immunity is discarded, limited, or 
preserved in whole, this Article’s proposal would be beneficial. This is because there 
are circumstances in which qualified immunity does not apply and yet the 
nonpecuniary burdens of suits can lead to overdeterrence. And, of course, the 
application of qualified immunity does not mitigate (but instead aggravates) the 
substantial threat of underdeterrence discussed elsewhere in this Article. In fact, by 
winnowing liable parties to only the “the plainly incompetent” and “those who 
knowingly violate the law,”210 qualified immunity concentrates liability on those 
defendants who are particularly likely to have been influenced by bias or some other 
factor that impacts deterrence. The need for deterrence-correcting exemplary 
damages is therefore widespread under the current qualified immunity regime. 
E. Determining Damages 
This Part concludes by discussing one practical obstacle to this Article’s proposal: 
the difficulty that courts will face in identifying factors that distort the constitutional 
tort system. It will be rare, for example, for an official policymaker explicitly to admit 
to the influence of bias in her decision-making. Yet uncovering bias, stress, stigma, 
or any other such influence is a necessary prerequisite for a court considering 
tailoring damage awards.  
Fortunately, many of these effects will be revealed by circumstantial evidence. 
There are times at which the broader context of a particular policy will strongly 
 
 
 207. Needless to say, such a policy might appear to reward wrongdoing, in which case it 
could lead decision makers to incorrectly appraise the disadvantages of violating the 
Constitution.  
 208. Myriam E. Gilles, In Defense of Making Government Pay: The Deterrent Effect of 
Constitutional Tort Remedies, 35 GA. L. REV. 845, 857 (2001). 
 209. Other alternatives could be to return to the subjective standard in qualified immunity 
or to limit qualified immunity’s application to circumstances in which it is necessary to avert 
grave injustice or to prevent irremediable overdeterrence. The current doctrine places the 
burden on the plaintiff to show that the violated right in question was clearly established. See, 
e.g., Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009). 
 210. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 343, 341 (1986). 
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suggest that bias influenced the decision-making in question; it could be fair to apply 
a rebuttable presumption of racism throughout much of the Jim Crow South, for 
example.211 A similar approach may be useful in evaluating the stress or stigma 
burdens of a suit: claims brought under the Takings Clause will generally impose 
fewer stigma-related burdens on defendants than claims brought under the Eighth 
Amendment; and certain types of cases—claims demanding significant discovery, 
for example—are far more likely to give rise to protracted litigation than others.212 
Distortions in deterrence caused by problems with uneven enforcement can likewise 
be revealed circumstantially: a state without a well-staffed affiliate of the ACLU and 
with no other comparable public-interest organization may be able to operate with 
more impunity vis-à-vis civil rights violations than a state with numerous NGOs and 
plaintiffs-side firms ready and willing to litigate over wrongdoing. Along similar 
lines, state-by-state and circuit-by-circuit differences in precedent will render claims 
that are nearly guaranteed in one jurisdiction dubious propositions if filed 
elsewhere.213 And underdeterrence will result everywhere for certain types of claims 
that are universally disfavored—like, following Employment Division, Department 
of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, a large proportion of claims brought under 
the Free Exercise Clause.214  
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belong. See, e.g., Jennifer L. Eberhardt, Phillip Atiba Goff, Valerie J. Purdie & Paul G. Davies, 
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876 (2004) (presenting a study and describing a large body of research “highlight[ing] the 
robustness and frequency of [the stereotypic association of Black Americans as violent and 
criminal]”); Anthony G. Greenwald & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Social Cognition: 
Attitudes, Self-Esteem, and Stereotypes, 102 PSYCHOL. REV. 4, 11 (1995) (also discussing 
implicit biases more generally); Anthony G. Greenwald, Debbie E. McGhee & Jordan L. K. 
Schwartz, Measuring Individual Differences in Implicit Cognition: The Implicit Association 
Test, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1464, 1476–77 (1998). 
 212. Decreasing damage awards due to the stress of the case could perversely incentivize 
defense lawyers to unnecessarily draw out cases: by doing so, defense lawyers (who are 
typically paid by the hour) will earn more and their clients, if found guilty, will be responsible 
for paying less. 
 213. One recent example of how important jurisdiction can be in constitutional claims is 
the recent ACA case, in which litigants filed in the Northern District of Texas, in part because 
the district only has one judge, who was thought to be favorable to their claims. Adam Liptak, 
Texas’ One-Stop Shopping for Judge in Health Care Case, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 24, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/24/us/politics/texas-judge-obamacare.html [https://perma 
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Others?, 45 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 171, 188–89 (2011). 
 214. Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 874 (1990); see also 
Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 450–51 (1988); Lukumi Babalu 
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A number of these problems with deterrence will also result from, and be revealed 
by, structural decision-making problems. A police department that has no procedure 
for tracking the liability that results from its policymaking, for example, is unlikely 
to base its policymaking on correct assessments of that liability.215 Similarly, a 
municipality in which damage awards are paid through a general fund and therefore 
do not as directly translate into consequences for the liable departments will be more 
susceptible to information-based deterrence failures.216 And, somewhat more subtly, 
decision makers will be particularly vulnerable to political distortions in the 
perceived costs or benefits in question when the population affected by a policy has 
little political capital and, therefore, limited ability to exert any direct political 
influence on decision makers.217  
Basing exemplary damage awards on such circumstantial and structural evidence 
will not only help correct for any distorting effects but it will also encourage policy 
changes, incentivizing states and municipalities to introduce or improve on 
preventative measures to guard against the effects of bias-inducing circumstances. 
Identifying the existence of a problem, however, is only half the battle: a court 
must also produce some estimate of its effects. To some extent, this is a problem in 
the context of private law torts as well, where calculations of emotional distress and 
other similarly difficult-to-measure damages are the norm.218 Yet the number of 
overlapping effects at play in this context and the particularly high stakes of getting 
it right may set constitutional torts apart.  
Fortunately, perfection may not be necessary. Because there is no acceptable 
amount of influence for biases to exert on constitutional deterrence,219 courts may 
continually ratchet up bias-related exemplary damages until there is no longer any 
evidence of bias in the department or municipality in question. Take, for example, a 
police department beset with indicia of bias that has implemented a policy giving rise 
to constitutional wrongs. If a court awards bias-related exemplary damages, one of 
 
 
Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 521 (1993). 
 215. Schwartz, supra note 106, at 1069–70. 
 216. Schwartz, supra note 102, at 1150. 
 217. See supra Section II.D; Levinson, supra note 25, at 379. As such, policies that 
disproportionately impact politically vulnerable populations are less likely to correctly value 
or balance the costs and benefits at stake than policies that disproportionately affect 
populations with political influence. And because politically vulnerable populations will often 
also be disfavored out-groups, deterrence problems resulting from distortions in the translation 
of the costs of litigation will disproportionately coincide with instances in which bias also 
influences constitutional deterrence: these effects will aggregate. As described in Section II.D, 
however, political-to-economic cost translation issues aren’t exclusive to bias. See supra 
Section II.D; see also Levinson, supra note 25, at 348 (stating deterrence problems may 
sometimes manifest absent any bias). 
 218. See, e.g., Mark Geistfeld, Placing A Price on Pain and Suffering: A Method for 
Helping Juries Determine Tort Damages for Nonmonetary Injuries, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 773, 
775 (1995) (discussing the “inherent difficulties in placing a monetary value on [certain 
losses]”); Samuel R. Berger, Court Awarded Attorneys’ Fees: What Is “Reasonable’?, 126 U. 
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“the risk of non-recovery”). 
 219. See supra Section III.B (discussing when bias’s effects are unacceptable). 
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three things might happen: the department will make policy changes that fully 
mitigate the bias in question, the department will make policy changes that do not 
fully mitigate the bias, or the department will make no policy changes. If, in a 
subsequent lawsuit against that department, the reviewing court discerns that the bias 
in question appears to persist, it would be justified in awarding relatively more 
exemplary damages.220 Exemplary damage awards would then be increased in every 
subsequent lawsuit until they are sufficient to prompt effective policy change.221  
Although attempts to closely tailor damage awards to deterrence in individual 
cases could lead to a more rapid perfection of constitutional deterrence, ad hoc 
tailoring is not necessary for this approach to succeed. In fact, a fixed damage 
multiplier that increases with every subsequent holding that a previous award of 
exemplary damages prompted no meaningful change could eventually accomplish 
the same goals: such an approach would lead to incremental policy change that 
continued until the municipality or department in question implemented a set of 
policies that effectively immunized the decision makers in question against bias or 
other deterrence problems discussed throughout this article.222  
This same approach may not be as promising when bias or some other influences 
on deterrence leads to overdeterrence.223 This is because the salve for 
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overdeterrence—reducing the damages awarded—also has the effect of diminishing 
a department’s incentive to mitigate the influence in question. This may even give 
rise to a negative feedback loop wherein reduced damage awards disincentivize 
policies that guard against bias, leading to more bias, leading to further reduced 
damage awards.224 As such, there is less leeway in the context of overdeterrence to 
use an incremental approach rather than attempting to closely tailor damages to 
deterrence. 
CONCLUSION 
Enforcement and recovery gaps are likely prevalent throughout the constitutional 
tort system, especially in the context of the policing or governing of marginalized, 
oppressed, or politically powerless communities. This is not, however, a necessary 
consequence of the need to ensure effective governance and policing; tailored 
damage awards may present a better tool for balancing the competing interests 
implicated by constitutional torts. 
 The usefulness of this Article’s instrumentalist tort-like framework is not 
limited to the preceding (admittedly far-reaching) discussion; it also presents a 
promising lens for considering and remediating new problems that may arise in 
constitutional tort law in the future. Should the Supreme Court decide to revisit its 
absolute immunity doctrine for policy reasons, for example, it should do so on these 
terms. Protections like prosecutorial immunity are undoubtedly important, but they 
come at a real cost. When the Court fails to consider the inherent tradeoffs of its 
jurisprudence, it risks creating doctrines like qualified immunity that poorly balance 
the interests at stake. 
The point of this examination is not, however, to resolve every problem that arises 
in the context of constitutional litigation. Instead, this Article seeks, through its 
reconstruction of constitutional torts, to lend greater coherence to this confused and 
confusing area of the law and to better facilitate the optimal operation of the 
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